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The Department of State bulletin

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The Basic Weakness of Despotism

by Under Secretary Lourie¹

Lithuanians and persons of Lithuanian descent have been identified with this country in many ways. By their skills and hard work, Lithuanians have materially assisted in the development of this nation. Their arts and crafts have enriched our cultural life. I heard many favorable comments on the Festival of Lithuanian Art and Culture, so capably organized by your Mr. Olis, which was presented in Washington last year.

Victor Bremer (Victoras Baronas), the designer of the Lincoln penny, was of Lithuanian birth. And you will recall that the great Lithuanian patriot, President Smetona, died in this country in 1943. Thus he is linked with America.

I think that the work of the Council itself should be noted. You have organized and led the movement of Lithuanian-Americans in opposition to the tyranny that the Soviet Union has imposed on your country of origin. You have helped maintain the idea of an independent Lithuania, free of the shadow of the Soviet Communist or any other oppressor. You have further performed the valuable service of making public in this country information about the Soviet occupation and the courageous refusal of the Lithuanian people to accept Communist dictatorship.

It is essential that the Lithuanian people know that they are not forgotten and that their countrymen in America likewise look forward to the day when they shall be released from bondage. These activities play a significant part in keeping alive the spark of freedom in that oppressed land.

And they are not forgotten. The United States well remembers the formation of the Baltic Republics. From this side of the Atlantic, we watched with interest as the young republican governments assumed their responsibilities. It was a source of great satisfaction to see how these new States progressed and prospered. And it was with a deep sense of personal grief that we viewed the tragedy of the Soviet takeover.

¹ Address made before the American-Lithuanian Council at Chicago, Ill., on Nov. 28 (press release 642).

As far as the U.S. Government is concerned, the incorporation of the free Republic of Lithuania and her Baltic neighbors into the Soviet Union has never been recognized. We shall continue to maintain that position unaltered.

You may recall that the then Acting Secretary of State Welles denounced the encroachment of the Soviet Union on the Baltic States when it took place in 1940. At that time he declared, "The policy of this government is universally known. The people of the United States are opposed to predatory activities no matter whether they are carried on by the use of force or the threat of force."

Since that statement was made, we have witnessed a variety of tactics in aggression by dictatorial regimes. And what we have seen has strengthened and confirmed this position.

Similarly, we refuse to recognize as the legitimate government of the people of Lithuania the quisling regime established there by the Kremlin. And consistent with that refusal, we continue to regard the distinguished Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary Povilas Zadeikis as the official representative of Lithuania in this country. Minister Zadeikis can boast the longest term of service of any Minister in Washington, and I might add that Lithuania is fortunate in having a representative of his caliber and experience.

This Government has been active in Lithuania's behalf in other capacities. At such international meetings as the Postal Union Congress and the Telecommunications Conference, the U.S. delegation has worked successfully with the representatives of the other free nations to block the efforts of the Soviet Union to seat puppet representatives from the Baltic States.

There is more that can be done. Wherever practicable we shall do it. A committee of the House of Representatives headed by Congressman Kersten is launching an inquiry into the forced incorporation of the Baltic Republics by the Soviet Union. I understand the matter will be

explored fully with due attention to the violations of agreements and treaties between the Soviet Union and the Baltic Republics committed by the Soviet Union. It is also understood that the hearings will expose the methods employed by the Communists in their aggression against Lithuania and the other Baltic States.

The Department is giving the fullest cooperation to this committee. Secretary Dulles has planned to appear before it and present a statement.

I am sure that the results of the hearing will be beneficial. And I am also certain that the public airing of the methods by which the Kremlin destroys the free governments and institutions of small neighbors will have a real impact upon world opinion.

Baltic Tragedy Duplicated Elsewhere

As we know, the plight of the Baltic Republics is duplicated with equal tragedy elsewhere in central Europe and in Asia as well. In this respect the annihilation of Lithuanian independence is one segment of a larger problem—that of aggressive despotism.

Now, if we are to deal effectively with despotism, we must study it so that we are fully aware of its strengths and weaknesses. We must also examine, with equal care, the counterforce which we employ. I mean the force of freedom. If, in this examination, we discover a fault in the structure of despotism and if we can oppose it effectively, we can advance step by step in the struggle against communism.

Tyrants and their tyranny are not new to the world. At one time or another, most of the world's surface has been subject to them. We therefore have a wealth of experience upon which to draw, because in its essentials the tyranny of communism has many qualities in common with the despotism practiced by other dictators in other eras.

There have been other periods in history when the tide of tyranny ran at flood levels and when it seemed that the remaining islands of freedom must be engulfed. But always, the tide reached a peak and then ebbed.

I think it important here that we adjust our perspective. The flood levels of earlier tides of despotism have run higher than the one we now face. Early in the history of the American Republic, a so-called "Holy Alliance" of European despots including Czar Alexander extended their domain over much of the civilized world and their rule reached into North and South America. Alaska was a Russian possession, and Russian influence penetrated as far south on the Pacific coast as the San Francisco area.

But an ebb set in, as strong as the flood. The power and domain of the despots receded. In the course of the century following the Napoleonic

period, freedom and constitutional government were extended to many countries once subject to despotic rule.

Certainly there were many physical factors—military, political, and social—that contributed to the contraction of this despotic power. And I believe that similar factors would be found to be at work in the decline of other tyrannies. But if we go below the surface, we discover that these physical factors were set in motion as a result of a basic weakness in the structure of despotism.

This weakness is a callous and complete disregard for the rights of man.

I would like to quote to you a recent comment by Secretary Dulles on this phenomenon which he made during his speech in Cleveland a week ago. He declared:

Despotism can always be routed if free men exploit that weakness. If our example can illumine again the great advantages of a free society, then Soviet communism . . . will lose its grip upon the enslaved whom it now holds. The tide of despotism will recede during the second half of this century as it receded during the first half of the preceding century.

You may hear this theory challenged by some who assert that technical advances in such instruments of dictatorial control as weapons, armor, and communications have simplified the problems of policing the subject peoples. Thus, it is argued, the despot need have no concern for those under his rule.

It is true that mechanical advances have made the control of a captive population easier in some respects. It is also true that hazards of unorganized resistance are substantially greater. But despite these facts, the theory still stands.

Significance of Iron Curtain

This is proved by some of the actions of the Kremlin itself. A major item of evidence is the existence of the Iron Curtain. The reason for the Iron Curtain is to prevent the peoples of the captive nations and the peoples of the Soviet Union from receiving the information which will permit them to compare their life and their standard of living with that which prevails in the free nations of the West.

This action certainly evidences a deep concern over discontent of the people.

The Kremlin has also demonstrated great anxiety over the effect of western contacts on Red Army troops. It has been reported that after World War II large numbers of military personnel who had participated in the offensive in central Europe were transferred to the Soviet interior and subjected to a reindoctrination before reverting to civilian life.

The Communist leaders were obviously afraid

² BULLETIN of Nov. 30, 1953, p. 741.

of the effect on these troops of what they had seen and learned outside the Soviet sphere. Again, we see here the deep-seated concern over dissatisfaction.

And it has been reported that this practice is still in force. The troops garrisoned in East Germany, on returning to the Soviet Union, are intensively reschooled to cleanse them from contamination by what the Communists term the "bourgeois standards and ideas." This is probably a necessary and difficult job after their contact with the freedoms and the higher standards of the West.

If this confession of weakness is involuntary, as it would appear to be, it is, for that reason, more compelling evidence that the basic weakness of tyranny remains unchanged.

We then come to the question of the application of the theory by the free nations. How best can this weakness be exploited?

In a number of ways—by capitalizing on the basic strength of a democratic society, its concern for the rights of the individual; by emphasizing the political and economic justice that comprises the essential framework of a free society; by continuing to show the great strength and productivity of free men; by demonstrating the fruits of liberty itself.

There are many means by which this can be accomplished. In the United States, our immense productive power has enabled us to rebuild our military strength and assist our allies to reconstruct theirs and at the same time improve our standard of living.

In conjunction with our allies, we are well along in the organization of a voluntary defense association of the Western nations which initially aimed at securing the North Atlantic area from the Communist threat. The defense coalition now supports European political and economic integration. As this is achieved the economies of the participating nations will be substantially strengthened. We hope that political frictions which have for decades plagued that region will be eliminated.

The voluntary character of this association stands in sharp contrast to the open use of force by which the Soviet Union retains its hold on the satellites. Of this contrast, peoples on both sides of the Iron Curtain are fully aware. We have made strenuous diplomatic efforts to reach settlements with the Soviet Government—thus far without success. However, these efforts have exposed the real nature of the Soviet position on international issues.

For some years, the United States and the other Western Powers have been trying to get Soviet agreement to a unification of Germany as a free and democratic state. We have also consistently pressed them to terminate the occupation of Austria. Until recently, the Soviet Union attempted

to maintain that it really favored both these moves but could not accept the means proposed by the West to bring them about.

The recent exchange of notes between Britain, France, and the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other unmasked the dishonesty of the previous Soviet stand. In their note of November 3,² the Soviets put forward extreme demands which they knew to be completely unacceptable to the West. They thus made clear that the Kremlin has no intention, at this time, of doing anything about bringing to an end the German or the Austrian occupation.

The latest Soviet note of November 26 appears, on the surface, to accept our repeated proposals for a conference on Germany. This appearance however is deceptive. The note attempts to overcome some of the disastrous consequences of its predecessor. Thus it is a tactical retreat. In the matter of substance the note sticks to all the positions put forward in the previous note. Thus it confirms the impression that the Soviet Union is not prepared to agree to a unification of Germany on anything like acceptable terms. And Austria is not even mentioned.

Phony Soviet Attitude

I think we can be fairly sure that this Soviet stand is determined by necessity. The Kremlin, in the past, had taken great pains to maintain the pretense of wanting unification of both Germany and the restoration of full independence to Austria. They did not want to be identified as the party blocking it. That would have had an adverse effect on the people in their areas of occupation and throughout the satellites.

This phony attitude was also consistent with their so-called peace offensive and the suggestions coming from Moscow that a means of peaceful co-existence might be worked out. This latter was an important element in their campaign to drive a wedge between the Western Powers and prevent the formation of the projected European Defense Community.

Now all of this, from the Kremlin's point of view, served a highly desirable purpose. I do not think we assume too much if we assume that the Soviet leaders would not have hardened their line unless they were forced by circumstances and the effectiveness of our policies to do so.

It may be that the June uprisings in Germany raised a danger signal. The complete inability of the East German puppet regime to deal with the disturbances may have come as a shock to Moscow. It showed them that a Soviet withdrawal from East Germany would probably result in the prompt collapse of the puppet government. It also demonstrated that the East German police

² *Ibid.*, p. 745.

and the paramilitary forces created there by the Soviet Union were not as reliable as they were thought to be.

In sum, it displayed for the Kremlin's benefit, and for the other satellites and the free world as well, the abject failure of the Soviet policy in East Germany.

Of itself that is significant. But that is by no means all. Consider the Kremlin's position. The situation in Germany might be duplicated to a greater or a lesser degree in the other puppet States. There had been other signs of unrest.

If such were the case, it is clear that the Soviet Union would want to avoid any serious discussion of the withdrawal of Red troops from East Germany. Such a move might set off a chain reaction throughout the other central European satellites.

Information about developments behind the Iron Curtain is limited and not always reliable. Moreover it is always risky to be positive about the causes which underlie Soviet actions.

I believe we are on solid ground in our analysis of the present attitude of the Kremlin. There has been a much harsher political policy imposed on Eastern Germany. The puppet regime has undergone a purge and punitive measures have been taken against those who took part in the uprisings. In both East Germany and the other satellites, concessions have been announced with respect to agricultural products and consumer goods.

The motives behind these concessions and the results remain to be seen.

Let us not overlook the general significance of these developments in Eastern Europe. They indicate clearly that tactically the Kremlin has been forced on the defensive. The political and moral initiative is retained by the West.

To me, these gains constitute proof of the effectiveness of the theory I have stated and the methods we and our allies used to apply it. These gains also point the way to the course we should follow in the future.

We know that the direct or indirect use of force would fail of its purpose because it would expose to annihilation those we wish to see returned to freedom. We know that nonviolent methods can accomplish as much, and more, than can be accomplished through force. We have seen the vulnerability of the Soviet system to the constant pressure exerted by the sheer superiority of a free society.

In effect, we must in the time to come constantly increase this pressure by our demonstration of freedom in action.

I can think of no more appropriate conclusion of this discussion with you than to read to you a message from someone who has a sincere interest in your organization. You know him and I am sure admire and respect him as I do. Here is the message:

Mr. Anthony J. Rudis
Chairman, American-Lithuanian Council
Grand Ballroom
Morrison Hotel
Chicago, Illinois

I am happy to send warm greetings to the National Convention of the American-Lithuanian Council. I know your earnest devotion to the cause of liberty, to the cultural and spiritual traditions of the Lithuanian people, and to the free institutions of our American Republic. I congratulate you on your past achievements in serving these ideals, and I send best wishes for the continued success of your work.

Americans are well aware of the qualities of extraordinary determination, fortitude, industry and integrity which your Lithuanian fathers brought to the life of this Nation. These same qualities are the strength still sustaining the Lithuanian people as they await the day when independence will enable them to prosper again among the family of free nations.

It is signed by the President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Education for a Peaceful World

*Remarks by the President*¹

White House press release dated November 19

First, I should like to make of record the deep sense of distinction I feel in the honor conferred upon me by the trustees of this great university. I personally feel that the greatest honor that can come to an individual under the various aspects of our Western civilization is to be awarded an honorary doctorate by one of our great educational institutions.

I should like also to address a word to your new Rector. Now, my own sojourn as a President of a university was not long enough to entitle me to speak to him in words of advice. Moreover, Sir, I should say that fairness and frankness compel me to say that I heard no great clamor or outcry or protest or incidents of any kind when I left the exalted ranks of college presidents, and again donned the uniform of my country.

But I was privileged to stay long enough in such a position to confirm my belief—my faith—that in the institutions of higher learning, in the secondary and primary schools of this country, there is, almost, our greatest opportunity to help satisfy man's oldest yearning: to live in peace with his fellows.

I believe that in the university resides a great opportunity and a great responsibility to bring about a peace that is based upon the only durable values.

Those who seek peace in terms of military

¹ Made on Nov. 19 after the receipt of an honorary degree of Doctor of Laws at the special convocation commemorating the 15th year of the establishment of the National Catholic Educational Association, Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C.

strength alone, I am certain, are doomed to end up in the agony of the battlefield. There is no peace only in tanks and in guns and in planes and in bombs—even with the most terrifying instruments of destruction that science has produced. I am convinced there is no peace alone in edicts and treaties, no matter how solemnly signed. There is none in economic arrangements, no matter how favorable they will be. Not in these things alone. There must be knowledge, and there must be understanding to use knowledge. And the understanding cannot be only of ourselves, and of our aspirations and of our hopes, and the knowledge that our purposes are pure. We must have understanding of others, and realize among other things that people the world over have, after all, many things in common.

It is my unshakeable conviction that no people, as such, wants war. On the contrary, I believe that the longing for peace among those people that we now must class as hostile to us is as great as it is among us. Else, why would their leaders have constantly to urge upon them the argument that we know to be false, that the free world wants war?

In this understanding, that I believe must undergird and substantiate the validity of any kind of peace treaty among the nations, is an understanding of the essential spiritual character of man.

Here in such a university as this, it seems to me there is sort of a happy marriage between the determination to instruct in the spiritual and moral values of life, as well as to develop the intellectual capacity of the students. Only as they grasp these truths and learn to understand, to appreciate and to sympathize with these longings of mankind, are we going to build a true peace.

And so let us by no means neglect the strength that we must have, the military strength, the economic strength. Let us by no means neglect anything that we can do through the normal channels of diplomacy and by agreements among ourselves. But let us remember that we must achieve, first, among those who think somewhat as we do, a unity—a unity based upon an understanding of those basic aspirations and values. And then in that strength of unity, seek tirelessly to convince others that a world of peace will be a world of prosperity and happiness, the kind of world in which men can satisfy their natural longing—their material, their spiritual, and intellectual aspirations.

In all of these things, it seems to me, the university has a special responsibility, a special opportunity. And in that sense, I address myself to the new Rector in terms of envy. Unworthy as I am, I should like to have that task.

The Problem of Sea Water Pollution

by John W. Mann

For well over half a century governments have legislated separately against the preventable release into their navigable waters of polluting refuse matter. The discharge of oil and oily water, with consequent fouling of beaches and harbors, fire hazard, and injury to fish and wildlife, has been particularly objectionable. In some countries shipowners and petroleum associations have conducted studies and voluntarily taken preventive measures. The subject has also been considered internationally and is presently being studied under the auspices of the United Nations.

The problem in its international aspects is sometimes complicated by apparent confusion as to the desired objective. It is not always clear whether what is wanted is international control on the high seas or better control by the governments in their own territorial waters. Cases of preventable pollution of the high seas would in most cases be diffi-

cult or impossible to substantiate. Control of harbor and other local waters would be a national or local matter in each case. The breaking up of submerged or stranded wrecks with release of cargo or bunker oil cannot be prevented by legislation.

In the United States, a number of State and local governments have adopted preventive laws or regulations. Prior to June 7, 1924, there was no Federal law specifically prohibiting the discharge of oil into navigable waters of the United States, although the War Department could proceed under the act of June 29, 1888 (so-called New York Harbor Act) in cases of the discharge of oil into the Harbor of New York and adjacent waters. In addition, the River and Harbor Act of 1899 contains a general prohibition against the dumping of "any refuse of any kind or description" into navigable waters.

A letter from the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, dated April 13, 1953, in reply to an inquiry from the Department of State, gives the following statistics concerning the enforcement of the Oil Pollution Act of 1924. The average number of prosecutions under the Act of 1924, annually, are

Philadelphia District.....	3
Baltimore District.....	18
Norfolk District.....	11
Office of Supervisor of New York Harbor.....	19
Total	51

The Office of the Supervisor of New York Harbor also reported an average of about 15 cases a year under the New York Harbor Act of 1888 and about one case a year under the River and Harbor Act of 1899. The Districts almost exclusively proceed under the act of 1924 rather than the act of 1899 because of the more effective prosecution possible under the former. The combined reports indicate convictions in the majority of cases. In no case was a prison sentence imposed. The fines imposed varied from \$500 to \$1,800 (the maximum fine provided by the act is \$2,500). Suspensions or revocations of ships' officers' licenses for oil pollution, authorized by the act of 1924, are rare, although two such cases were acted upon by the U. S. Coast Guard in 1951. This phase of the 1924 law is seldom invoked either because the individual responsible for the oil pollution is not present at the hearing conducted by the Coast Guard or because sufficient evidence is unobtainable; furthermore, 70 percent of the oil pollution violations involve vessels of foreign registry manned by foreign officers whose marine licenses are not subject to suspension or revocation by the U. S. Coast Guard. These statistics include only cases referred to a U. S. Attorney for prosecution and do not include instances where the District Engineer did not consider prosecution to be feasible because of inadequacy of the evidence obtained or for other reasons.

Oil pollution of the coasts of the United States is under the cognizance of the Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army. The Coast Guard investigates incidents of oil pollution and furnishes findings to the District Engineer. A study of all cases of oil pollution reported during 1949 by all U. S. Coast Guard districts bordering on the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Pacific Ocean, and including Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Hawaii, and Alaska, was initiated by the American Merchant Marine Institute and the U. S. Coast Guard. This study, which was completed in June 1950, indicated that insofar as the coastlines of the United States and its territories are concerned pollution of sea water by oil is not a serious problem, and the United States under domestic legislation is able adequately to cope with most of the pollution reported.

Two years before the enactment by the United States of the Oil Pollution Act, 1924, the British Government also sought to protect the territorial waters and harbors of Great Britain and Northern Ireland by enacting the Oil in Navigable Waters Act. In 1924 British shipowners appointed a joint committee to consider preventive measures.

International Consideration of Problem

Consideration of oil pollution as an international problem was suggested by the United States Congress in 1922. By Joint Resolution approved by the President July 1 of that year, the Congress called attention to the damage being done through dumping of oil refuse on the high seas as well as in territorial waters and requested the President to call a conference of maritime nations with a view to adoption of effective means for the prevention of pollution of navigable waters.¹

With a view to preparing the way for the calling of an international conference as contemplated in the Joint Resolution, an interdepartmental committee was set up to study the problem of oil pollution, including ways and means in use, or in the course of development, for the prevention of oil pollution by ships. Representatives of the following Departments served on the committee during the period of its existence: State, Treasury, War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, and Commerce. The United States Shipping Board also served. Two subcommittees were appointed: one on complaints and the other on causes and means of prevention.

The subcommittee on complaints reported on February 6, 1923, that the existence of serious oil pollution in American waters was beyond dispute; that instances had been reported in the waters of every seaboard State except New Hampshire and Mississippi; and that the sources of pollution were oil-burning ships, oil tankers, shore refineries, and fueling stations. The work of the subcommittee on causes and means of prevention developed into a series of studies and investigations with participation of the various Government departments concerned, the American Petroleum Institute, and the American Steamship Owners Association.

The investigation included the more technical aspects of the problem, the local laws and regulations in effect, and the measures taken in other maritime countries with a view to a solution. The Department of State informed the governments of leading maritime nations that the United States was giving consideration to calling an international conference on oil pollution and invited and received from them information and comments. The interdepartmental committee submitted its report March 13, 1926.

¹ 42 Stat. 821.

Preliminary Conference

At the invitation of the United States a preliminary conference of experts met at Washington on June 8, 1926, to consider questions relating to oil pollution with the object of facilitating an exchange of views on technical matters and formulating proposals for dealing with the matter through international agreement. The following Governments participated: United States, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden.

The Washington Conference agreed that there had been a marked diminution of oil pollution since attention was first called to it, both because of the action of the governments and the voluntary cooperation of the interests involved. The Conference could not agree as to the extent and effect of pollution by oily deposits on the high seas at distances greater than 50 miles from shore. It therefore recommended that a system of areas should be established on the coasts of maritime countries and on recognized fishing grounds within which no oil or oily mixtures should be discharged. Each country was to determine the width of the areas off its coasts, following the general rule that the width of the area should not exceed 50 nautical miles. In special cases, where peculiar configuration of the coast or other special circumstances render such a course necessary, the width might be extended to 150 nautical miles. Each government was to use all reasonable means to require its vessels to respect all such areas. Each government should observe the effect of the system off its coasts and exchange information which would be coordinated and circulated by a central agency to be established. The Conference submitted for the consideration of the respective governments a draft convention embodying its recommendations.

The International Shipping Conference (composed of private shipowners' organizations of principal maritime countries) also met in 1926 and considered the pollution problem. It felt unable to make any definite recommendations, although, at the instance of that conference, a number of shipowners of various countries agreed to follow the practice, already adopted by some, of voluntarily refraining from discharging oily water within 50 miles of the coast.

Presentation of Problem to League of Nations

The problem was laid before the League of Nations by the British Government in 1934. The League's Council decided in 1936 to convene an international conference to consider a draft convention prepared by the League's Transit Organization in 1935 and based on the work of the Washington Conference of 1926. The conference was

not held, because the Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan, considered essential to the success of any arrangement, would not attend.

The suggestion that separators should be installed in ships as a partial solution, which had been made as a result of earlier studies, produced energetic opposition in some quarters. The League's draft convention, like the Washington document, provided for the establishment of zones and did not require the fitting of separators on ships.

As an international problem, oil pollution of the seas was in abeyance during and immediately after World War II. A great deal of pollution resulted from the sinking of ships by enemy action, but this was recognized as unavoidable, and the maritime countries were engrossed with other matters.

In the United States, a bill was introduced in the 80th Congress, Second Session,² which was designed to strengthen the Oil Pollution Act of 1924 by increasing the maximum fine permissible from \$2,500 to \$10,000, the minimum fine from \$500 to \$1,000, and the provisions for imprisonment from a maximum of 1 year to a maximum of 5 years. One-half of the fine levied would be paid to any individual (other than a United States enforcing officer) furnishing evidence of the violation. The sponsor of the bill, Chairman Schuyler O. Bland of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, inserted in the *Congressional Record* of April 14, 1948, a statement citing a great many instances of oil pollution. However, a report by the Coast Guard analyzing all reported cases of pollution by oil of United States shorelines during the following year, 1949, led to the conclusion that existing domestic laws and regulations could adequately deal with all but a very few of the instances studied.

Action by United Nations

In the case of a number of other countries, it is understood that the ill effects of oil pollution have been a growing problem. Damage to the coasts of Britain, France, the Netherlands, Western Germany, Denmark, and Ireland has been reported, as well as damage to coasts in Mediterranean areas. The matter was taken up by the United Nations which, on December 20, 1949, issued a history of previous efforts dating back to 1926 to control the pollution of sea water by oil.³ The document included a copy of the proposed draft convention prepared by the League of Nations in 1935. The subject was scheduled for discussion at meetings of the United Nations Transport and Communications Commission beginning March 27, 1950.

² H. R. 4468.

³ U.N. doc. E/CN. 2/68.

In the United States, the U.N. document, as well as subsequent papers on this subject, was referred for development and recommendation of a U. S. position to the Shipping Coordinating Committee, an interdepartmental committee on which are represented the Departments of Commerce, Defense, State, and Treasury, the Maritime Administration (now under the Department of Commerce), and the Bureau of the Budget. A number of industry and labor organizations have agreed to assist the Committee as advisers, and their views are invited as various phases of the subject come up for consideration. The National Federation of American Shipping and the American Petroleum Institute have been particularly helpful to the Committee in this connection. In dealing with this problem, the Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, also participated.

Following study and report by the Transport and Communications Commission and resolution by the Economic and Social Council, the Secretary-General of the United Nations requested the views of governments on a number of points. The United States reply, as developed by the Shipping Coordinating Committee and transmitted by the Department of State in November 1950,⁴ was to the effect that a recent study of oil pollution along the coastlines of the United States and its territories disclosed no present need for action; that a meeting on the subject does not appear to be necessary in the near future but, if such a meeting is to be called on the basis of pollution reported by other governments, the United States would desire to be represented; that the draft convention prepared by the League of Nations appears to constitute an appropriate initial basis for any discussions which may prove necessary, although some of the information is somewhat antiquated; and that a constitutional question as to how far the admiralty jurisdiction of United States courts could be extended outside its territorial waters would require further study before the United States could be prepared to discuss it.

On January 9, 1951, the Transport and Communications Commission issued a summary of the various replies received from governments to the Secretary-General's inquiry.⁵ Although it had been generally decided that the matter would be one for the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (Imco), the proposed specialized agency of the United Nations, these replies showed a majority of countries in favor of taking preliminary action without waiting for the establishment of Imco. There was divergence of opinion as to whether a special body of experts should be convened to study the subject or whether study should be made by the individual governments. It was also obvious from the replies that there

was serious misunderstanding as to whether the problem was to be considered as an international matter for the control of pollution on international waters or whether it was to be treated as an international problem of bringing about adequate control of national waters.

The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations adopted on August 11, 1951, Resolution "F" on the subject of pollution of sea water by oil. This resolution noted that some Governments have already undertaken studies of pollution of sea water, invited other Governments possessing technical facilities to undertake similar studies, invited Governments to communicate the results of their studies to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and instructed the Secretary-General to transmit the results of these studies to the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization when it starts functioning.

In accordance with this resolution the Shipping Coordinating Committee undertook a study of, and prepared a report upon, pollution of sea water by oil in waters of the United States and the contiguous high seas. A copy of this report, which has the approval of all members of the Shipping Coordinating Committee and of its industry advisers and which was transmitted on March 31, 1952, to the United Nations, follows:

REPORT OF STUDIES BY THE UNITED STATES ON THE SUBJECT OF POLLUTION OF SEA WATER BY OIL⁷

Proposed to be communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with Resolution "F" of the Economic and Social Council, Thirteenth Session

Pollution of the coasts of the United States by oil discharged from passing vessels does not present any serious problem. The abnormal wartime condition, with heavy tanker losses in nearby waters, is past; however, many tankers with full cargoes of oil were sunk off North American coasts and, as these vessels gradually go to pieces, some local beach pollution will be experienced. It is still possible for a ship to cause coastal fouling through rupture of a compartment which contains or has contained oil, due to stress of weather or to stranding. Such an occurrence is infrequent and cannot be legislated against.

Pollution in harbors and enclosed waters may occasionally be found, usually in small areas and due to local spillage. National legislation and municipal regulation adequately penalize negligence and are rigidly enforced. Pollution by industrial wastes or raw sewage probably exceeds, in many cases, that by oil. Interested and responsible authorities in the United States are in agreement that pollution of the territorial waters of the country by oil is not serious and shows no sign of increase.

The active seagoing merchant marine of the United States, aggregating 13,611,000 gross tons, uses oil for fuel almost exclusively. It is also probably safe to say that the great majority of foreign vessels entering United States ports or passing along its coasts use oil for fuel, either under boilers or in internal combustion engines. Four hundred and forty-seven United States vessels, of a total of 4,197,000 gross tons, are tank vessels.

In most of the principal United States ports sludge

⁴ U. N. doc. E/CN.2/100.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ U. N. doc. E/2082.

⁷ An analysis of this report is contained in U.N. doc. E/CN.2/134.

barges are generally available for receiving contaminated water discharges. In the case of tanker terminals a slop-main is usually provided by the oil company and oily water is discharged therein directly from the tanker.

There have been instances of harbor fires due to oil on the surface of the water. In all cases these have been due either to casualties or to neglect in observing prescribed precautions.

There are several types of shipboard oil separators, the costs of which are in the neighborhood of \$18,000-\$20,000. The usual capacity is 50 tons per hour. Substantial numbers were installed in the United States ships built during World War II. Such separators are designed to remove all but 0.05 per cent of oil from the water efflux.

The United States has no data with respect to the distance which oil or oily water may drift and still appreciably contaminate beaches or affect fisheries. This would presumably vary with the nature of the oil and the degree of its dilution at discharge, as well as wind and surface currents.

Certain proprietary solvents are available for the treatment of oil and sludge. Their primary use seems to be to soften and remove residual deposits in oil tanks. Claim is made that these render the oil soluble in water if used in sufficient quantity. Use of such solvents does not seem to be widespread.

It is indubitable that if heavy oil is spread—from any source—upon stagnant water such as marsh, waterfowl alighting thereon will be unable to rise again. A sufficiently heavy contamination of open water probably would have a deleterious effect on upper-level fish. Such concentrations are unusual and are generally the result of a casualty to a ship. The Government of the United States does not feel that further investigation in such cases is necessary. In the case of relatively minor contamination no serious effect has been perceived on fish or shell fish.

In conclusion, the Government of the United States is of the opinion that the question of pollution of national or territorial waters is one to be met as requisite by national action. For waters of the United States this has been done with satisfactory efficacy. In respect of pollution of the high seas the United States has insufficient evidence that this is of such seriousness as to require international action. The Government of the United States stands willing, however, to participate in any further joint studies that may be deemed desirable or necessary.

As an additional means of research, the British Admiralty announced in October 1953 a plan by the National Institute of Oceanography to drop 10,000 plastic envelopes into the sea in the various seasons of 1954. The dropping track will run from the Bay of Biscay, roughly in a semicircle of 500 miles radius, to a point halfway between the Hebrides and Iceland. Each of the envelopes will contain an instruction sheet in eight languages and a franked, addressed post card on which will be printed a list of questions. Finders of the envelopes will be asked to fill in their names and addresses and the date and place of recovery of the envelopes. Upon receipt of each returned card, a reward of a British half-crown or its foreign-exchange equivalent will be paid to the sender.

It is expected that, from the many envelopes which will eventually float ashore on the British coasts and the coasts of other countries in north-west Europe, it will be possible to estimate the speeds and directions of the currents. If a large percentage of the envelopes dropped in any area is recovered, it will be assumed that oil jettisoned in that area is likely to drift ashore.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, following resolutions adopted by the Economic and Social Council and the Transport and Communications Commission, on May 7, 1953, requested governments of member states submitted in the matter, including the United States, to make experts in this field available to him, at the expense of those governments, with a view to correlating the studies and other communications submitted by interested governments and drawing such conclusions as may be appropriate for transmittal to the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization when that organization shall have started its activities.

The United States in reply referred to its previous communications setting out its views and stated that, while it has a great sympathy with, and interest in, the efforts of other governments with regard to this matter, it does not desire to participate in this study at this time. It stated also that it is prepared to furnish copies of laws and regulations and information with respect to the educational programs of the maritime industry of the United States designed to encourage the curtailment of pollution of territorial waters of the United States. The educational programs have been of significant value to the United States Government.

Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, the Minister of Transport on September 24, 1952, appointed a committee whose members were nominated by the interested governmental agencies and by the shipping industry and the oil companies. Its purpose was to consider what practical measures can be taken to prevent pollution by oil of the waters around the coasts of the United Kingdom. The committee reported on July 2, 1953, after comprehensive investigations and experiments, including, for example, study of the drift of oil in the sea. Among its recommendations is one that the British Government as soon as possible should seek the agreement of the other maritime countries to the fixing of a date after which discharge into the sea of persistent oils by ships of any country would be prohibited.

Progress in United States

In conclusion, it seems fair to assume that substantial progress is being made, through enforcement of national and local legislation and through voluntary efforts of private interests, in the prevention of sea pollution by oil. Although in the United States a great deal has been accomplished along those lines including the provision of receptacles for contaminated water sludge at terminals and most principal ports, it appears that the governments of some other countries, where the problem presumably is more acute, are convinced of the need for international action. Recommendations for such action now under consideration contemplate the establishment of areas or zones

on the high seas where discharge of oil or contaminated water would be prohibited. There is no pressure for any international requirement for the installation of separators. It is noted that the comprehensive British study completed last July recommends that separators be required only on ships of United Kingdom registry which use tanks alternately for oil fuel and water ballast; the report stated that deep-sea tankers can, without the use of separators, effect separation of most of the water by settling in a slop-tank. The possibilities of chemical treatment as a means of preventing oil pollution have not been overlooked in official reports of some governments, but their recommendations point to further study along this

line. The need for adequate facilities for the reception of oily residues at oil terminals, ship-repairers, and in ports and harbors has been stressed in the various studies, but in some countries it appears that insufficient provision has been made for that purpose.

• *Mr. Mann, author of the above article, is a foreign affairs officer in the Office of Transport and Communications Policy. From 1951 until 1953 he was stationed in London as Supervising Maritime Attaché for Europe. Previously he had served as Executive Secretary of the Shipping Coordinating Committee and Assistant Chief of the Shipping Policy Staff.*

The United States Looks at the United Nations

by Robert Murphy

Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs¹

Groups like you throughout the country, and in many other lands, are doing a lot of thinking about the responsibility of education in preparing a new generation for this new kind of world in which we live. I know that, in your local school systems and through your own Boards of Education, you will want to consider how the facts of international cooperation can best be taught.

It may be helpful to you if I describe tonight some of the conclusions I have reached about the usefulness to our country of the United Nations and its specialized agencies under present world conditions.

Starting with the assumption that as Americans all of us have roughly the same basic aims—I believe that is a fair assumption—I like to think of these basic aims in terms of the simple things we want in our everyday lives. We want to worship God as we please, to live in our homes and communities without fear, to exchange views freely with others, to be able to work usefully, and to enjoy the fruits of our own labor.

Bitter experience has taught us that these aims are not easily achieved. There are many obstacles at home and abroad. But I am sure we would all agree that the overriding obstacle to a greater

achievement of these basic aims of ours is Soviet imperialism.

The menace of Soviet imperialism overshadows all else in the effort to win for all Americans the opportunity to lead the kind of lives they want to lead.

This calls for working together with other peoples who share our aims. It would be folly to go it alone. Together with our friends we are building a common defense and are seeking to reduce tensions. We are cooperating to improve conditions of life which breed communism or weakness.

We did not seek this responsibility, but world changes, including changes affecting the British Empire, have tapped our country as the leader of the free world. We must use our great material power, and our equally great moral power, as a nation in a manner promoting the greatest possible unity with our allies. Whether we like it or not, we are in a complex of world power politics.

There are those who, knowing the power we could wield, wonder and sometimes complain that as the leaders of the free world we do not use that power to impose what they feel certain would be right. On the other hand, we are sometimes suspect abroad by those who see coercion behind American proposals no matter how generous. These difficulties are apart from the fact that it is

¹ Address made before the Texas Congress of Parents and Teachers, San Antonio, on Nov. 19 (press release 626 dated Nov. 18).

not easy to find the formulations which, like magnets, will draw countries together in support of common aims for their own good. Nevertheless, free association is the only decent way to live, nationally and internationally. It is the only safe way to live. For both isolation and coercion are bound to bring disaster.

So we have been trying to weld together, to strengthen, that part of the world that is free. And one of the most effective ways of doing this is through the United Nations.

In talking about the United Nations as one feature of American foreign policy, I do not overlook the fact that in our dealings with foreign countries we depend also on traditional diplomatic channels as well as on the Organization of American States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for Europe and the Pacific Treaty arrangements with Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Japan, to mention a few.

On the subject of diplomacy, I think we have had a tendency to underestimate our own accomplishments. It was Will Rogers, I believe, an American for whom I have always had great admiration, who once made a wisecrack to the effect that the United States had never lost a war nor won a conference. I am sure that, if Will were here tonight, he would admit that all things in this world are relative. There are no absolute victories in either wars or conferences.

Relatively, we have not done so badly. Look at the diplomatic history of some other countries. The foreign policies of the Matsuokas and the Tojos brought disaster to our friends, the Japanese people. The diplomatic course pursued by Hitler and Mussolini brought misery and tragedy to our friends, the Italian and the German people. The diabolical Soviet policy which led to the conclusion of the mutual nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany on August 23, 1939, divided Poland, and precipitated World War II, paid a bloody dividend to the Soviet Union of some ten million killed. The aggressions of which they are guilty since World War II may prove very expensive to their people even as Korea is a glaring example of failure in a stupid campaign for world domination.

A Word on Behalf of U.S. Diplomacy

So I'd like to say just a word in support of American diplomacy which has guarded our national interest without serious disaster to our own people. To speak up in favor of American diplomacy has lately not been fashionable. But I firmly believe that the country will profit if the American people, who stand for fair play and in whose judgment I have implicit faith, when they know the facts, will give their diplomats (who are more than the people's business agents abroad) their understanding and support. The fact is that American foreign policy safeguards the best

interests of the United States. Hysterics and detractors to the contrary, our position in the foreign field is stronger today than that of any other country.

Our strength in part stems from our membership in the United Nations. Quite frankly, I am not here tonight to examine with you whether or not we ought to belong to the United Nations. That, for most Americans, as for me, is settled. The United Nations is, as President Eisenhower recently put it, "sheer necessity." It is American policy to support the United Nations. We believe that the United Nations is essential in the conduct of our foreign policy.

We take this position with confidence and assurance, because we know from our careful studies of American public opinion that the vast majority of Americans continue to believe in the value of the United Nations and to support U.S. membership in it. In spite of some strong minority attacks in local areas, I can report to you that no other institution or issue in the field of foreign relations draws such sustained support from organizations and groups of citizens throughout the United States.

Now this support does not mean at all that we as a government or as a people are blindly committed to some visionary adventure. It does not mean that the United States has sacrificed sovereign rights to the United Nations or that the United Nations is the only instrumentality of our foreign policy. Nor do we have to accept without question proposals of other nations or agree with the actions or views of United Nations officials when they are contrary to our national interest.

What this support does mean is simply that we intend as a nation to do our best to fulfill our obligations as a member of the United Nations. We want to use United Nations machinery wherever it will be helpful. We want to see the United Nations as an instrument of world peace get stronger, not weaker.

And, I believe, it is getting stronger. It is getting stronger even though it has had to develop differently from the expectations of its founders.

The founders of the United Nations had high hopes for the new organization based upon the expectation that the great nations who had successfully worked together for victory in World War II would continue to work together for peace. That expectation proved erroneous. The wartime cooperation was the result of common danger, and, when that danger was dissipated, allied unity was replaced by new division and new fears.

There is an old saying, "Don't forget that the ally of today may be the enemy of tomorrow." No sooner had the United Nations begun to meet in 1946 than it became clear that the Soviet Union was acting directly in conflict with the idea of great power cooperation and to the basic purposes of the United Nations Charter. This could have disrupted the United Nations completely. But

it did not. Instead, it provoked a search for ways to enable the United Nations to adjust itself to these greatly changed circumstances.

Let's take a closer look, now, at how the United Nations has been developing in these times when our first concern must be how to frustrate the Soviet threat to our free way of life.

In the first place, the Communists have not been able to use the United Nations to serve their own ends. They have tried to use it as a sounding board but have only succeeded in opening the eyes of a vast portion of the globe to the insidious nature of their propaganda.

They have never been able to control any of the operations of the United Nations. The Soviet bloc has 5 votes out of 60 in the General Assembly. I do not recall that any major Soviet proposal has ever been adopted, and I can think of hundreds that have been passed over their violent objections. Over 140 times the Soviet bloc has tried to seat Chinese Communist representatives in the United Nations, and each time they have been frustrated.

The Soviet Union has tried to hamstring the United Nations in security matters by abusing its veto power. But this has led to a shift of power from the Security Council to the General Assembly where there is no veto. The General Assembly is now prepared to handle the basic problems affecting world peace.

U. N.'s Usefulness to Free World

So, while the Soviet bloc has certainly not fulfilled its promises in the United Nations—quite the contrary—it is clear on the record that it has not been able to turn the United Nations to its own advantage. On the other hand, in a variety of ways the free world has been able to use the United Nations to further its own ends and to thwart Soviet objectives—by repelling Soviet-engineered aggression, by settling conflicts within the free world, by exposing Communist techniques of subversion, by promoting better conditions of life, and by easing the transitions to self-government in colonial areas.

Let us look at a few of these. I begin with the repelling of aggression in Korea, for that was the greatest test of the youthful organization.

Some people rightfully question why the United Nations was not better prepared to meet the Communist attack in Korea and why other U.N. members did not make more of a contribution to the U. N. effort there.

In 1950, when the Republic of Korea was attacked, the U.N. job in some ways represented an attempt to make bricks without straw.

Because the Soviets had failed to carry out their commitments, the United Nations had no standing armed forces with which to discourage or to combat aggression. Such forces, therefore, had to be raised with the consent of the states concerned, starting from scratch. Some of you may recall

the motion picture *High Noon* and the situation which confronted the village marshal in trying to round up deputies to deal with the impending arrival of desperate outlaws. The troubles the marshal faced because the village leaders—good, sincere family men—hesitated to risk their lives are at bottom no different from those the United Nations faced in attempting to send aid to the Republic of Korea in resisting the unprovoked and brutal aggression to which it was subjected in June 1950.

In this pioneer enterprise in collective security, unlike the marshal, the United States did not have to fight alone. The record in Korea was good. Fifty-three nations supported the United Nations action. Forty-six gave material assistance. Sixteen sent armed forces to fight.

Of course, it would have been better if the military burden had been shared more equally. But some members had other pressing military commitments, such as France in Indochina, Britain in Malaya, and all the Western European members of NATO. Others simply do not possess armed forces that can stand up to modern war.

Given all the difficulties, the response of the United Nations to this first major test of open aggression was encouraging enough to maintain faith in its possibilities.

The comparison that must be made is not between what actually happened and what might have happened in an ideal world. That is not a true test. The comparison we should make is between what did happen and what would have happened if the United Nations had not come to the assistance of the Republic of Korea. Not many of us would want the world of the fifties to go the way of the world of the thirties, where the League of Nations failed to prevent World War II.

Without U. N. action, the United States would have had to assist the Republic of Korea alone or else to have given up Korea to the Communist attackers. For us to have chosen to go it alone in Korea would have meant that our own sacrifices would have been even greater than they are and our motives might have been suspect. Our unilateral action might have been mistaken in many quarters for an imperialist adventure in Asia.

On the other hand, failure to resist the attack would have allowed Communist forces to flank Japan and place in jeopardy all of our Western Pacific defenses. The anti-Communist forces in Southeast Asia might have disintegrated. And the fall of Korea would have made resistance to Communist aggression in Europe more difficult. From positions unfavorable to the free world, the Communists would have been emboldened by success to attack other victims, with all the danger of an ultimate world war.

Instead, by United Nations resistance in Korea the free world has built up its strength to a point where it now represents a much firmer barrier to

future aggression. As the bitterness and the pain of the Korean struggle recede into the background, I believe that the American people will increasingly agree that no other honorable course could have been taken by this country.

So the Korean armistice agreement is, I believe, a real achievement. For the first time, collective security through an international organization has worked on the battlefield. And this has been done without resorting to global war.

I think that a namesake of mine, Sergeant 1st class Robert Murphy, summed this up about as well as anyone I know. Sergeant Murphy holds the Purple Heart with three clusters as a result of wounds in World War II and in Korea. Here's what he said:

I found out that a fellow can get over just about any kind of setback if he knows that he was hurt fighting in a good cause, doing his duty the best that he could.

In Korea, there were South Koreans and British and French and Dutch and Colombians and Greeks and other national units in the Eighth Army fighting with us.

I knew many of these men personally and found that no matter what tongue they spoke, we all could share the satisfaction of being comrades, of fighting for a common ideal, the United Nations and the rule of law against an aggressive force that threatened to destroy it. Usually a law is an old, well-worn rule. In Korea it was different. Whenever we had a spare moment to think about such things at all, it seemed that the only law anywhere around was the new one we were together helping to make.

Nowadays, you can hear a lot of people running down the moral issue on which the war in Korea was fought, saying, "All that talk about principles is the bunk and nobody really ever believed it." When they do that, they take away from the soldier about the only reward he has—the self-satisfaction he feels within himself for having defended his country and a cause that was right! So don't tell a fighting man his contributions weren't worth it. He won't like it.

Now that the military operations are concluded, the United Nations is concerned with three major problems in Korea:

First, we are seeking to prevent a breach of the Armistice provisions on prisoners of war. As a matter of common humanity, we have absolutely refused to force any prisoner in our hands to return to Communist tyranny against his will. Recently, we have seen the Communists suffer one stunning defeat after another in their vain efforts to induce these anti-Communist prisoners to return.

Secondly, we are seeking to arrange for a political conference in accordance with the Armistice Agreement and with the resolutions of the General Assembly. We earnestly desire that such a Korean political conference be held and held soon, so that progress can be made toward unification of that country and withdrawal of all foreign forces. If one is not held, the blame will fall squarely where it belongs, on the Communists.

Thirdly, the United Nations is concerned with the reconstruction of wartorn Korea. Those of you who have lived in countries that have been

disrupted by war realize its effects on the social life and economy of the country. Korea is no exception to that rule. I have seen a good many countries that have been victimized by both World Wars, and I can assure you that the devastation in Korea equals the tragedy I saw in Berlin and in other German cities after World War II.

If I have lingered on the subject of Korea, it is because the Korean problem represents the supreme test of the United Nations thus far. But Korea is only a small part of the United Nations story. It would be misleading to ignore or minimize the many other U.N. activities in the political and security field which serve to strengthen the free world.

Examples of Preventive Action

The job of settling disputes and stopping small wars is not spectacular, but it is preventive action by the United Nations which keeps crisis situations from erupting into world conflicts. In Palestine, Indonesia, Greece, and Kashmir, the United Nations has fulfilled this function. In two of these cases, new nations have been born as a result of U.N. action. Many problems remain in these areas of tension, but they are not being solved by large-scale hostilities. They are being talked out, not fought out.

I am not suggesting that U.N. intervention in such situations has the effect of waving a magic wand, of stilling all passions, and of abolishing all signs of violence or injustice. Not at all! But the readiness of the United Nations to act is a principal deterrent to those nations who might otherwise break the peace in areas where unusual bitterness festers and peace treaties cannot be negotiated. In Palestine, Kashmir, and along the northern frontiers of Greece, for example, the presence of U.N. observation groups serves this valuable purpose.

The United Nations also serves the free world by providing an outlet for the expression of world opinion and by acting as the conscience of mankind. Of the 74 items on the agenda of the General Assembly session now under way in New York, two are particularly important in this regard.

Just a few weeks ago, the General Assembly renewed its discussion of the false Communist charges that the United Nations engaged in germ warfare in Korea. The Communists have for over a year relentlessly spread throughout the world their vicious and lying propaganda on our alleged use of germ warfare in Korea. It has been an elaborate and total effort of the Communist propaganda machine and not without some success in many areas.

The United Nations provided the most effective forum for answering these charges. We challenged the Communists to an impartial investiga-

tion. Soviet refusal to submit to such an investigation created grave doubts about the validity of their charges. But the total falsity of their charges could not be set before the world until the U. N. prisoners of war were repatriated. Dr. Charles Mayo, world-famous surgeon and member of our delegation to the General Assembly, was then able to present to the United Nations the actual experiences of those American prisoners who were forced to confess to these charges by the Communists and of others who did not confess despite the cruel pressures of their Communist guards.² This documented presentation told a dramatic story of how the Communists fabricated their charges. The nakedness of the Communist lie was evident for all to see. Dr. Mayo's forceful and convincing U. N. speech dealt a crippling blow to the credibility of all Communist propaganda.

We have a further opportunity in the United Nations to reveal to the world the Communist record of brutality, when the General Assembly discusses the atrocities committed by the Communists in Korea. This matter was placed before the Assembly almost as soon as the Army released its war crimes report, a shocking record of barbarism against both U. N. prisoners and non-Communist Koreans.

In still another field the United Nations performs a uniquely useful function. The free world has demonstrated over and over that it sincerely desires agreement on a disarmament program that provides adequate safeguards for all concerned. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, despite its specious propaganda claims of support for disarmament, has adamantly refused to go along with U. N. plans. Instead, the Communists have asked for paper prohibitions on atomic weapons and for disarmament arrangements which they, behind the Iron Curtain, could evade with impunity. Airing this problem in the United Nations has exposed the hypocrisy of the Soviet position on disarmament.

Despite the present unhelpful Soviet attitude, it is important that the technical disarmament work in the United Nations continue. The President and the Secretary of State have made it plain that, as progress is made in settling political issues which create world tensions and as world trust is strengthened, we can proceed concurrently with the task of reducing the armaments burden.

Not long ago we thought of arms reduction in terms of financial savings and political pacification. Today we think of it as a measure of sheer survival for civilization.

As Secretary Dulles has said, when the moment comes in which political leaders would be prepared to put into effect international agreements limiting armaments, we must be able to seize it

quickly. We must not let it escape, because it might never be recaptured.

U.N.'s Economic and Social Work

Let me now turn from the political activities of the United Nations, which often attract more attention, to its equally important work in the economic and social field. This type of work, when wisely conducted, is one of the essential elements in wiping out the root causes of war and communism. Take, for example, the U.N. Technical Assistance Program. Henry Ford, II, also a member of our present delegation to the General Assembly, recently showed how and why this program is to our interest. He said:³

The American people recognize that the continued existence of very low living standards in large areas of the world is unhealthy. We know that the existence of vast depressed areas is a heavy drag upon the whole world economy. The American people, who have experienced the benefits of a vigorous and prosperous economy, have a real stake in the development of similar situations abroad. We are not interested in exploiting anybody. We are interested in the mutual advantages which flow from an unfettered exchange of skills, goods and ideas with other peoples. This is neither altruism nor imperialism—it is simply enlightened self-interest.

Certain other U.N. agencies make real contributions to our everyday life which receive little attention. For instance, when the World Health Organization moves in to fight cholera or malaria in Southeast Asia, it is not only protecting American citizens in those areas but also preventing the spread of these diseases to our own shores. Overseas communications and trade would be chaotic without the International Postal Union and the International Telecommunication Union. When the International Refugee Organization found homes for over a million refugees from behind the Iron Curtain, it removed a possible source of future tension.

One of these specialized agencies, UNESCO, has been a subject of particular controversy in some areas of our country. The purpose of UNESCO is to promote international understanding and peace by the advancement of human welfare through education, science, and culture. The present administration in Washington undertook an independent appraisal of the organization to determine if the charges against it were valid. President Eisenhower assigned Col. Irving Salomon of California, Mrs. Elizabeth Heffelfinger of Minnesota, and President John H. Perkins of the University of Delaware to do this important job. They found that:

1. UNESCO does not advocate world government or world citizenship in the political sense.
2. UNESCO does not attempt, directly or indirectly, to undermine national loyalties or to encourage the substitution of loyalty to and love

² For text of Dr. Mayo's statement, see BULLETIN of Nov. 9, 1953, p. 641.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 19, 1953, p. 531.

for a supranational authority for loyalty to and love for one's own country.

3. The official bodies and the personnel of UNESCO observe the provision of the UNESCO constitution which prohibits UNESCO from interfering in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of member states. UNESCO does not attempt to interfere in the American school system.

4. There was no evidence of atheism or anti-religious bias in any of UNESCO's work.

The report not only found no basis for these charges about UNESCO, but went on to make some valuable suggestions for increasing UNESCO's contribution to our national interest.

The United Nations is also doing useful work for the free world in dependent areas which have not yet reached the stage where they can govern themselves.

Today a number of dependent peoples seek greater political and economic freedom. The job of the United Nations is to channel these rightful aspirations toward the constructive evolution of self-government or independence. By helping dependent peoples to move forward gradually, by assisting them in preparing themselves for the great responsibilities which independence and self-government entail, the United Nations is helping to create conditions in these areas in which communism cannot grow. By forwarding the orderly development of peoples through a gradual process, we can hope to avoid violent revolutionary situations which Soviet communism would seek to exploit to its own advantage.

In a general way I think I have indicated how broadly based our interest in the United Nations is and why its activities are so important to us.

What does all this cost us? The U.S. assessment for its share of the budget of the United Nations and its specialized agencies this year cost each person in the United States just 16 cents, less than the fare for one bus ride in the city where I work. All American contributions to all U.N. agencies, including the cost of maintaining our own staffs there, come to less than one dollar per person per year. This includes the voluntary contributions this Government makes to such special programs as the International Childrens' Fund, the Korean Relief Program, the Palestine Refugee Relief Program, and the Technical Assistance Program. I think you'll agree with me that this is a prudent and economical investment for America's future.

Summing it all up, then, it seems to me that our wisest course is to continue to cooperate fully with other friendly states in the United Nations to our mutual advantage; to build up the structure of regional security organizations within the framework of the United Nations; to develop to the full the procedures for peaceful settlement which the Organization affords; to make the United Na-

tions increasingly effective as the voice of the conscience of mankind; and to use it wherever appropriate to improve conditions of life everywhere. If we follow this course, we shall be living up to our responsibilities in this turbulent world and at the same time serving the best interest of the American people.

U.S. Willing To Consider Any Soviet Proposal on Austria

Press release 635 dated November 25

Following is the text of a note delivered to the Soviet Foreign Office by the American Embassy at Moscow on November 25:

In its note of November 3,¹ the Soviet Government ignored the U.S. Government's invitation to discuss the Austrian State Treaty at a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers at Lugano. It said that it awaited a reply to its note of August 28 on this subject and confined itself to recalling the suggestion contained in its earlier notes for pursuing this question through diplomatic channels, without however putting forward by this means any proposal on the Austrian problem.

Ten years after the Moscow Declaration the Austrian people have still not obtained their complete political and economic independence. Wishing to fulfill the promise made in that Declaration and to comply with the U.N. resolution of December 20, 1952,² the U.S. Government has not relaxed its effort for the conclusion of a treaty. During the present year it has three times proposed that the treaty be discussed by the Deputies,³ and since August 28 it has twice suggested that this question be taken up at the proposed conference at Lugano.⁴

It is all the more surprising that the Soviet Government has not been willing to resume discussions on Austria in that the three Western Governments, in order to meet Soviet wishes, had in their note of August 17⁵ withdrawn the short draft treaty, the sole object of which was to achieve the earliest possible restoration of Austrian freedom and independence. In order to remove any possible misunderstanding, the U.S. Government wishes once more formally to state that this draft is withdrawn.

The U.S. Government believes that nothing stands in the way of the resumption of discussion on the Austrian State Treaty except the attitude

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 30, 1953, p. 745.

² *Ibid.*, Jan. 12, 1953, p. 69.

³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 135; Feb. 16, 1953, p. 260; Aug. 31, 1953, p. 282.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 14, 1953, p. 351; Oct. 26, 1953, p. 547.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Aug. 31, 1953, p. 282.

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of the Soviet Government. The U.S. Government is prepared to study any Soviet proposal which would promote an Austrian settlement and which does not raise extraneous issues. If the Soviet Government does not feel able to participate in the very near future in a conference of the Foreign Ministers, the U.S. Government hopes that it will see no objection to the resumption of the work of the Deputies at a date which the Soviet Government finds convenient. If, however, the Soviet Government would prefer to make proposals through diplomatic channels and, in particular, would give an indication of the basis on which it would be prepared to conclude the treaty, the U.S. Government would give any such proposal prompt and careful consideration.

Department's Views on New Soviet Note

*Statement by Henry Suydam
Chief, News Division¹*

The full text of the Soviet note [of November 26] was received only a few hours ago. This Soviet note is a reply to the identical notes which the three allies sent to the Soviet Government on November 16 in reply to the earlier Soviet note on November 3, which had rejected Allied proposals for a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers at Lugano to consider the German and Austrian questions.

1. One of the most significant and obvious aspects of the note is that it has been timed to coincide with the current foreign policy debate in the French Parliament and would appear therefore to represent another Soviet effort to impede progress on Epc ratification and other steps toward greater European unity and strength.

2. A second significant aspect of the note is that it is another effort to gloss over the uncompromising nature of Soviet policy, as exposed by the note of November 3. That note shocked the whole world by revealing that the Soviets were not willing to seek a relaxing of tensions unless the Western Powers in effect abandoned in advance vital policy and security positions. The present Soviet note, like the recent Molotov press conference, is an effort to overcome some of the disastrous consequences of the November 3 note. In this respect it represents a tactical retreat and is further evidence that Soviet policy is on the defensive and that the free world has the diplomatic and moral initiative.

3. As far however as substance is concerned, the Soviet note adheres to all the positions which were put forward in previous notes and repeated at the

current session of the U.N. General Assembly. The unacceptable nature of these positions has been made evident by delegates from many countries and reflected in overwhelmingly adverse Assembly votes. Therefore, from the standpoint of real substance the note is disappointing.

4. The Soviet note will, of course, continue to receive the most serious study and consideration by this Government. The Bermuda conference of the heads of the United States, the United Kingdom, and French Governments will afford an early opportunity for full consultation among the three governments to whom it is addressed.

Use of Terror Tactics in Soviet Zone of Germany

Following is a press release issued on November 17 by the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Berlin Element:

The recent well-publicized series of arrests and trials in the Soviet Zone is the most sweeping and sustained effort of its kind since the establishment of the Soviet Zone puppet government in 1949. Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Timberman, U.S. Commander in Berlin, stated today.

The number of persons involved, the severity of the sentences, and the deliberate creation of a "witch hunt" atmosphere of conspiracy, terror, and espionage indicate recognition by Soviet Zone authorities that the passive resistance of the population has not been broken and their consequent determination to try to break it with raw terror. Rarely have the East German Communist officials made so evident their lack of confidence in their own policies and their unwillingness to trust their social system to compete openly with that of the free world.

A study of the Soviet-licensed press since September 19 shows at least 23 separate trials or announcements of arrest actions in all parts of the Soviet Zone. A total of 74 persons have been listed as receiving sentences, of whom four were given the death penalty and 11 life imprisonment. It is evident that many more persons have in fact been arrested, many of whom have likely been convicted in secret trials. Even the published figures represent the most violent attack by the regime on the population since the formation of the Soviet Zone government.

June 17 Played Down

It is interesting to note that in only a few of these reported trials did the accusation of active participation in the uprising of June 17 play an important role. Obviously, Soviet Zone authorities are unwilling to face a showdown with public opinion on the issue of June 17. The most fre-

¹ Made to correspondents on Nov. 27 (press release 638).

quent accusations were the stereotyped charges of spying for foreign powers, for organizations like RIAS,¹ the Investigating Committee of Free Jurists, and the Fighting Group Against Inhumanity, or the preparation of acts of sabotage and terror.

Soviet Zone Definition of "Spying"

The accusation of spying, as used by Soviet Zone authorities, deserves closer scrutiny, because it bears no resemblance to the meaning of the term as it is used in nontotalitarian countries. The existence of organizations such as RIAS, the Free Jurists, and the free press in West Berlin has never been a secret. Nor is it a secret that persons from the Soviet Zone come to them to describe the conditions under which they live and to record injustices committed in the Soviet Zone. They do so because the Soviet Zone regime has deprived them not only of the right to give political expression to their wishes, which is the essence of democratic government, but also of the right to seek redress of wrongs done them and even of the right of criticism itself. It is because the Soviet Zone regime has made legitimate criticism impossible within its borders that its citizens seek out West Berlin as a place where they can be heard. In the eyes of the Soviet Zone authorities, it is this act of telling the truth about conditions under the Communist system which constitutes spying. Only persons who fear the truth could take such a view.

It is also a part of the totalitarian pattern of terror and falsehood to attempt to defame the opposition that has been suppressed. As it was with the Nazis, so it is with the Soviet Zone regime. For this reason, it is necessary that the Soviet-licensed propaganda organs picture the defendants at these trials as paid agents, criminals, or Fascists. The truth, that opposition to the regime springs from its own tyranny, is too painful for Soviet Zone officials to face.

Other Aims of Terror Campaign

Moreover in creating a false "spy and sabotage" psychosis, the regime is trying to place the blame for its own failures on some outside cause. Here too the vehemence of the attacks on so-called "saboteurs and terrorists" suggests that the failures are impressive, a fact already amply demonstrated by the vehemence of the June 17 uprising. In the Soviet-licensed press over the past weeks, individual blunders, objective difficulties, official wrong-headedness, and natural catastrophes have all been attributed to the sinister workings of agents and saboteurs.

There is also evidence that the regime is using the present trials of alleged "agents" to try to

blur the undeniable fact that the June 17 uprising was spontaneous and as a smokescreen behind which it is trying to liquidate persons accused of active participation in the June 17 uprising and persons suspected of maintaining opposition to the SED² since then.

Persons arrested because of their actions on June 17 were for the most part convicted in secret or were tried on other charges. The current spate of spy charges is evidently designed to provide a cover for further arrests and conviction of persons suspected of opposition to the regime, as well as for punishment of the remaining persons who have been under arrest since the uprising.

Role of Security Organs

The only new element in the present terror campaign, aside from its unprecedented violence, is the novel attempt to popularize the State Security Police and to endear it to the citizenry as a friend and helper. In unprecedented public appearances, Security Secretary Ernst Wollweber and his deputy, "Lieutenant General" Erich Mielke, have spoken before groups of workers and sought to propagate the notion that the presence of a vast system of informers, of arbitrary arrests, and illegal detentions for unlimited periods is a necessary and desirable part of everyday life.

At the same time, Wollweber and Mielke's impassioned appeals for help from the population in tracking down opposition elements and their threats of punishment to persons failing to denounce their fellow citizens revealed that Soviet Zone residents are under no illusions about the real function of the security organs and that they withhold cooperation from these organs wherever possible. The assistance given to countless refugees passing through the Soviet Zone testifies to this attitude.

Significance of Terror

It is, as already suggested, a simple matter for the Soviet Zone security organs to lay hands on persons opposed to the regime since, as the June 17 uprising showed, nearly the entire population falls into that category. Moreover as the Soviet-licensed press has itself admitted in the course of the purge of "unreliable" elements of the SED and FDGB,³ even many of the small group of state and party functionaries are discontented and critical of the regime.

There is thus no shortage of candidates for arrests and show trials. United States officials see no indications of an early end to the present

² Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, the East German Communist Party.

³ Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, the Communist trade union organization.

¹ Radio in the American Sector.

wave of terror. But in showing once more who are the real "terrorists" in the Soviet Zone, the Soviet Zone regime is giving the lie to its claims of popular support won by the "new course" and demonstrating anew that its weakness is such that it can maintain itself only by continuous application of brutal terror methods.

Disarmament of Japan

Press release 684 dated November 24

When asked at his press conference on November 24 whether he was in agreement with a statement by Vice President Nixon, made in a speech while the latter was in Japan, to the effect that the United States had erred in trying to disarm or in actually disarming Japan at the end of the war, Secretary Dulles replied as follows:

Yes, I am in agreement with it. The United States carried forward programs for disarmament rather far both in relation to Japan and in relation to Germany at the end of the war. Some of the projects and propositions that were then adhered to have since been reversed. As Vice President Nixon said, those in charge of our foreign policy at that time seemed to have assumed, as was quite natural perhaps to assume—many of us did—that we were entering into an era of lasting peace and that the Soviet Union would not be a threat. Therefore it was thought the disarmament of Germany and Japan could proceed apace and would presumably be followed by a reduction of armaments on the part of all of the principal countries. You will recall that the charter of the United Nations, which was adopted at San Francisco actually just about the time that the German armistice was being concluded and before the Japanese armistice, contained provisions calling generally for the limitation of armament and the lightening of the load of armament upon the peoples of the world.

Panmunjom Discussions

*Following is a partial text of a statement made by Ambassador Arthur H. Dean at the November 17 session of the preliminary talks with Communist representatives at Panmunjom:*¹

I think that it is in your side's interests, as well as in the interests of the rest of humanity, to get these agenda matters settled quickly and to our mutual satisfaction. Our side has attempted to do so and will continue to do so within appropriate limits. Our side will leave no stone unturned in

¹For previous statements by Ambassador Dean, see BULLETIN of Nov. 16, 1953, p. 686.

our quest for a reasonable agreement with you. Panmunjom is most unsuitable [as a site for the conference]. It is not conducive to international negotiations.

I have several times suggested San Francisco, Honolulu, and Geneva as possible sites for the conference. We are openminded if the place is conducive to peaceful relations and has adequate and appropriate facilities for a conference. Surely, with all the world to choose from, some place other than Panmunjom would be satisfactory to you.

I do not wish to be argumentative, nor do I wish to say anything that would interfere with the smooth functioning of these negotiations where we have been making distinct progress.

But let me point this out to you: If this question of neutral nations had been raised during the armistice negotiations, it would have been debated and settled. But it wasn't. It was our understanding, at least, that your side did not want anyone at the conference who had not participated in the hostilities. After suggesting the United Nations itself, we acceded to your side's point of view and article 60 of the armistice agreement was drafted and signed accordingly; we made our plans accordingly. Once you depart from a principle, where do you stop? Whom do you select? Whom do you eliminate? Are there various shades or degrees of neutrality? By what formula did you select Russia and four Asian neutral nations? Why did you exclude other Asian nations equally neutral?

In an effort to be helpful, let me say this further on composition. The conference itself will be plenary. First, the United States is prepared to commit itself and to recommend to the other governments on our side at the conference that the question of additional participants at the political conference itself be considered after a completely satisfactory agreement is reached at the conference itself on a Korean settlement, and before other questions are discussed.

This would open the door to the possible inclusion of neutral nations if and when the political conference proceeds past the matters enumerated in paragraph 60 of the armistice agreement—withdrawal of all foreign forces and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. At the same time, it would respect the spirit and the letter of the armistice agreement by reserving participation in the conference on these two subjects to the governments concerned on both sides in the Korean hostilities. This seems a fair balance between the acknowledged interest of such neutrals in broader questions and the clear responsibility of the two sides which have been and remain concerned in the matter of a Korean settlement.

You may say that this is all right as far as it goes, but that it doesn't go far enough; that the belligerent sides may not be able to reach agreement on a Korean settlement, with the result that

the conference may never reach the stage where neutral nations could be invited under this formula. Of course, our side does not share such a pessimistic view of the conference. For we would be prepared to take all reasonable steps in good faith to make the conference a success. In order to allay any possible fears in this direction, we now make a second and companion proposal.

Second, the United States, without making any commitment as to the result, would also be prepared at the conference to recommend to all the other participants on our side that if developments during the course of the political conference after it is convened and after it has spent a reasonable time on substantive matters make it appear desirable to introduce additional participants beyond the governments concerned on both sides, our side would agree to the consideration of this question as to the composition of the conference at an appropriate time within the limits above set forth.

These seem to me to be eminently fair and reasonable proposals. They do not prejudice the need for additional participants but cover the possibilities. These proposals deal with either eventuality which may develop at the conference.

Subcommittee's Request for Talk With Igor Gouzenko

Text of Exchange of Notes

Press release 637 dated November 25

Following are the texts of notes exchanged by Secretary Dulles and the Canadian Ambassador at Washington, Arnold D. P. Heeney, concerning the request of Senator William E. Jenner, chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, that the Canadian Government make Igor Gouzenko available for questioning by the Subcommittee:

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of Canada, November 19

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Canada and has the honor to refer to the Ambassador's Note No. 807 of November 5¹ with regard to the request of Mr. Robert Morris, Chief Counsel for the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, to interview Mr. Igor Gouzenko in Canada.

The information in the Ambassador's note was conveyed to the Chief Counsel for the Internal Security Subcommittee, but its Chairman, Senator William E. Jenner, has now written to the

Secretary of State that "there are certain facts on espionage in the United States (originating with Gouzenko) now in the record of the Internal Security Subcommittee which do not appear in the report of the Canadian Royal Commission". Senator Jenner attached to his letter to the Secretary a Subcommittee press release of November 7, 1953, containing the text of the previous exchange of notes between the Secretary of State and the Canadian Ambassador on this subject, with comment by Mr. Morris, including the following:

Certainly the excerpt in the secret security memorandum of 1945, which has become known as the "Nixon Memorandum", concerning the fact that the secretary to the Secretary of State Stettinius was a Soviet agent, was not in the report of the Royal Commission.

There are also other statements in that same memorandum which likewise were not published in the Royal Commission's report.

In view of the foregoing, Senator Jenner has asked the Secretary of State to renew to the Canadian Government the Subcommittee's request that Mr. Gouzenko be made available for questioning by the Subcommittee.

The Ambassador of Canada to the Secretary of State, November 25

No. 864

The Ambassador of Canada presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to refer to his note of November 19, 1953, concerning the request of Senator William E. Jenner, Chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, that the Canadian Government make Mr. Igor Gouzenko available for questioning by the Subcommittee.

Careful consideration has been given to this request, taking into account the special responsibility which the Canadian Government has assumed for Mr. Gouzenko's protection and the arrangements which have been made to provide a new identity for him, his wife and family.

Mr. Gouzenko has been given the rights of Canadian citizenship and he is, therefore, at liberty to give his views on any question to anyone in Canada or the United States. He naturally must consider for himself the effect of his actions on the special measures that have been taken in his own interest and at his request, to protect his security and to conceal his identity.

The Canadian Government fully appreciates the importance of full and close co-operation between Canada and the United States in exchanging information important to the national security of both countries. All information, without any exception, which was provided by Mr. Gouzenko to the Canadian Government, has always been made available to the competent United States authorities as it became available to the Canadian authorities. Moreover, facilities have been ex-

¹ Not printed.

tended to the United States authorities to clarify any point arising out of Mr. Gouzenko's evidence or views. In this connection, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has had access to Mr. Gouzenko as and when requested. Mr. Gouzenko has, in fact, been interviewed on the F.B.I.'s behalf on a number of occasions, the latest date being August, 1950. This has been the situation since 1945 and remains the situation now.

The material secured in this way by the F.B.I. included information which was not made public in the Report of the Royal Commission because such information related to activities outside Canadian territory which was not relevant to that Report.

In addition to the facilities used and available to the F.B.I., the Secretary of State will recall that in May, 1949, the United States Government requested the Canadian Government to arrange for representatives of the Immigration Subcommittee of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary to interview Mr. Gouzenko confidentially in relation to the Subcommittee's examination of specific questions relating to immigration procedures. The Canadian Government made the necessary arrangements and the interview with Mr. Gouzenko took place under Canadian auspices in the presence of a member of the United States Embassy and two representatives of the Subcommittee. Mr. Gouzenko's evidence included general statements on the operation of Soviet espionage networks, as well as such information as he had concerning operations in the United States. This interview revealed no information which had not already been made available by the Canadian authorities to the competent United States authorities.

The note of November 19th from the Secretary of State refers to a "secret security memorandum of 1945." The memorandum referred to was apparently prepared by and is in the possession of the United States authorities. The Canadian Government is unaware what information is contained in this memorandum. In so far, however, as the excerpt from it in the Secretary of State's note which refers to a United States official is concerned, all such information from Mr. Gouzenko's testimony was conveyed to the F.B.I. through their representative in Ottawa.

As stated in the note addressed by the Canadian Embassy in Washington to the State Department on November 4, 1953, Mr. Gouzenko has denied to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that he has any further information to communicate.

It is in the light of the foregoing considerations that the Canadian Government has examined the second note of the Secretary of State on this matter. It is noticed that, whereas the first note forwarded a request of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee to interview Mr. Gouzenko in Canada, the present request of the Chairman is that

he be made available for questioning by the Subcommittee.

The Canadian Government believes that there has already been ample opportunity for Mr. Gouzenko to give information and make known his views to the United States authorities through established channels. Nevertheless, in view of the second note from the State Department, the Canadian Government is willing, if Mr. Gouzenko agrees, to make arrangements for a confidential meeting, under Canadian auspices, at which any person designated by the United States Government could be present, it being understood, as it was in 1949, that the evidence or information thus secured would not be made public without the approval of the Canadian Government.

Press Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 633 dated November 24

At his press conference on November 24, Secretary Dulles responded as follows to questions on the subject of inquiries from congressional committees and the exchange of diplomatic notes with the Government of Canada regarding the availability of Igor Gouzenko:

1. When asked to comment on the nature of his replies to Senators Jenner and McCarthy on their interest in interviewing Mr. Gouzenko, the Secretary replied:

I wrote them last night that I understood that a reply from the Canadian Government was in process of being sent to us here and that I thought that we should now wait to see what the Canadian Government had to say in response to our last inquiry of them before making any new inquiries.

2. When asked to explain his feeling about the propriety of a congressional committee making such inquiries and of the State Department in passing them on to a foreign government, the Secretary replied:

I think it is entirely appropriate for congressional committees to make inquiries of this sort through the regular department of government which deals with foreign countries. I think it is appropriate that we should have transmitted their requests to the Canadian Government. I think that is an orderly way in which to proceed. Naturally the Canadian Government will make its responses as a wholly independent, sovereign Government which has its own rights which it will defend as we would defend our own rights under like circumstances; and it also will, I trust, be motivated by the sense of friendliness between our countries just as we in our relations with Canada take that into account. We are two sovereign, independent countries, side by side, whose interests are inextricably tied together. There is between

us a close and long-standing bond of friendship, and I believe that taking all those factors into account that we can survive this present incident with continued mutual respect and friendliness.

3. When asked to comment on a statement in a speech of a member of the Canadian Liberal Party to the effect that Canadian Foreign Secretary Lester Pearson is a target of "some persons trying to throw mud across the border," the Secretary replied:

I am not aware of Foreign Minister Pearson's being the target of any responsible person or group whatsoever. The Foreign Minister has been well known by many people for many years as a strong and vigorous opponent of communism. We have worked with him in the United Nations and elsewhere, and he is well known to the American people as well as to the Canadian people. He is one of the few statesmen who is almost as well known abroad as he is at home, and I don't know of any responsible quarter which has any question whatever about Mr. Pearson's total and vigorous loyalty to the traditions of the free world.

Exchange of Letters With Senator Jenner

Senator Jenner to Secretary Dulles

NOVEMBER 25, 1953

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The offer of the Canadian Government, with respect to our request to question Mr. Igor Gouzenko, would be satisfactory to me as Chairman of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, if a member of the Subcommittee could interview Mr. Igor Gouzenko under Canadian auspices to determine what he knows about espionage in the United States.

Once having determined what Mr. Gouzenko knows, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee should then like to address itself to what should be done about the evidence or the information at that time.

I feel that the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee could not receive evidence vital to the security of the United States, and the United States alone, and commit itself not to make it available to Congress, if necessary. At the same time, if there is reason to keep the evidence secret, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee will use the discretion it always has used in these matters affecting security and comity between nations.

Would you communicate this position to the Canadian Government?

On behalf of the Internal Security Subcommittee, I would like to express the appreciation of the Subcommittee for your cooperation in these matters.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM E. JENNER

December 7, 1953

Secretary Dulles to Senator Jenner

Press release 643 dated November 28

NOVEMBER 28, 1953

MY DEAR SENATOR JENNER: I have your letter of November 25 with reference to the Gouzenko matter. I am glad to note that the November 25th response of the Canadian Government to our note of November 19, 1953, is satisfactory to you if a member of your Subcommittee can interview Mr. Gouzenko under Canadian auspices to determine what he knows about espionage in the United States.

I understand that in fact the Canadian Government does offer, if Mr. Gouzenko agrees, to make arrangements for a confidential meeting under Canadian auspices, to which any person designated by the United States Government could be present to interview Mr. Gouzenko.

With reference to the publication of Mr. Gouzenko's testimony, I note that you suggest that your Subcommittee should have the final decision as to whether to publicize or keep secret the portions of Mr. Gouzenko's testimony which your Subcommittee judges to affect only the interests of the United States and not those of Canada.

The Canadian Government, as I understand, takes the position that in the case of evidence or information secured in Canada under the auspices of the Canadian Government, that Government must have the right to approve publication.

I would not want to ask the Canadian Government to change its position in this respect because I believe that the United States would itself want to take a like position under similar circumstances. I feel that in these security matters the United States Government should never admit that any foreign governmental agency could overrule or supplant the judgment of the United States Government in deciding whether it is in the interest of the United States that publication be made of information obtained in the United States through an act of courtesy of the United States Government.

I know that it is your intention to exercise the right to publicize only when your Subcommittee considers that United States interests alone are concerned. But I believe that the Canadian Government is on solid ground in insisting that it should be the final judge of whether or not its interests are involved. I would, under similar circumstances, take the same position on behalf of the United States. I believe you would want me to do so.

I think we can all assume, and certainly this Government assumes, that neither of our two Governments would use its sovereign discretion arbitrarily to prevent a publication which is not affected with its own national interest and which would serve the interest of the other.

Under the circumstances you may feel that it is now in order to proceed pursuant to the response of the Canadian Government.²

I am grateful for the expression of the appreciation of your Subcommittee for my cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

Listing of Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War

White House press release dated November 19

The President on November 18 issued a proclamation enumerating articles which are to be considered arms, ammunition, and implements of war for the purpose of import and export license control under section 12 of the Neutrality Act of 1939.

The proclamation revises the list of articles enumerated in Proclamation No. 2776 of March 26, 1948,³ which it will supersede on January 1, 1954.

The new munitions list, which has not been changed since 1948, reflects developments in military equipment and changes in nomenclature since that time and provides the basis for a more flexible administration of United States controls over the arms traffic. It is the sixth revision of the list since 1935.

The Secretary of State is charged by section 12 of the act with the responsibility for administering the controls.

Text of Proclamation⁴

WHEREAS section 12 (1) of the joint resolution of Congress approved November 4, 1939, 54 Stat. 11 (22 U. S. C. 452(1)), provides in part as follows:

"The President is hereby authorized to proclaim upon recommendation of the [National Munitions Control] Board from time to time a list of articles which shall be considered arms, ammunition, and implements of war for the purposes of this section * * *"; and

WHEREAS section 13 of the said joint resolution provides, in part, that the President may exercise any power or authority conferred upon him by that resolution through any such officer or officers as he shall direct:

Now, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and

² Senator Jenner on Dec. 2 wrote Secretary Dulles indicating that the Subcommittee would accept the Canadian offer of a confidential meeting, under Canadian auspices, between Mr. Gouzenko and a person designated by the U.S. Government.

³ 13 Fed. Reg. 1623.

⁴ No. 3038; 18 Fed. Reg. 7505. For text of regulations governing the international traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of war, issued by the Department on Nov. 25, 1953, effective Jan. 1, 1954, see 18 Fed. Reg. 7623.

by virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the said joint resolution of Congress, and upon the recommendation of the National Munitions Control Board, do hereby declare and proclaim that the articles listed below and such components, parts, accessories, attachments, and related items as may be designated upon recommendation of the National Munitions Control Board in regulations issued by the Secretary of State and published in the Federal Register shall be considered arms, ammunition, and implements of war for the purposes of section 12 of the said joint resolution of Congress:

CATEGORY I—SMALL ARMS AND MACHINE GUNS

Rifles, carbines, revolvers, pistols, machine pistols, and machine guns using ammunition of caliber .22 or over.

CATEGORY II—ARTILLERY AND PROJECTORS

Guns, howitzers, cannon, mortars, tank destroyers, rocket launchers, military flame throwers, military smoke projectors, and recoilless rifles.

CATEGORY III—AMMUNITION

Ammunition of caliber .22 or over for the arms enumerated in Categories I and II hereof.

CATEGORY IV—BOMBS, TORPEDOES, ROCKETS, AND GUIDED MISSILES

(a) Bombs, torpedoes, grenades (including smoke grenades), smoke canisters, rockets, mines, guided missiles, depth charges, fire bombs, incendiary bombs.

(b) Apparatus and devices for the handling, control, activation, discharge, detonation, or detection of items enumerated in paragraph (a) of this category.

CATEGORY V—FIRE CONTROL EQUIPMENT AND RANGE FINDERS

Fire control, gun tracking, and infrared and other night-sighting equipment; range, position and height finders, and spotting instruments; aiming devices (electronic, gyroscopic, optic, and acoustic); bomb sights, gun sights, and periscopes for the arms, ammunition, and implements of war enumerated in this proclamation.

CATEGORY VI—TANKS AND ORDNANCE VEHICLES

Tanks, military type armed or armored vehicles, ammunition trailers, and amphibious vehicles (land vehicles capable of limited endurance in water), military half tracks, military type tank recovery vehicles, and gun carriers.

CATEGORY VII—TOXICOLOGICAL AGENTS

(a) Biological or chemical toxicological agents adapted for use in war to produce casualties or to damage crops.

(b) Equipment for the dissemination, detection, and identification of, and defense against, the items described in paragraph (a) of this category.

CATEGORY VIII—PROPELLANTS AND EXPLOSIVES

Propellants for the articles enumerated in Categories III, IV, and VII hereof; military high explosives.

CATEGORY IX—VESSELS OF WAR AND SPECIAL NAVAL EQUIPMENT

(a) Warships, amphibious warfare vessels, landing craft, mine warfare vessels, patrol vessels, auxiliary vessels, service craft, floating dry docks, and experimental types of naval ships.

(b) Equipment for the laying, detection, detonation, and sweeping of mines.

(c) Submarine nets.

CATEGORY X—AIRCRAFT

Aircraft and airborne equipment.

CATEGORY XI—MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT

(a) Radar of all types, including guidance systems and airborne or ground radio equipment therefor; electronic countermeasure and jamming equipment; underwater sound equipment; all other electronic equipment specially designed for military use; radio-communications equipment bearing a military designation; electronic navigational aids specially designed for military use such as radio direction finding equipment, radio distance measuring systems such as Shoran, and hyperbolic grid systems such as Raydist, Loran, and Decca.

(b) Aerial and special purpose military cameras and specialized processing equipment therefor; military photo-interpretation, stereoscopic plotting, and photogrammetry equipment.

(c) Armor plate, armored railway trains, military steel helmets, body armor, and flak suits.

(d) Specialized military mobile repair shops specially designed to service military equipment.

(e) Pressurized breathing equipment and partial pressure suits for use in aircraft, anti "G" suits, military crash helmets, parachutes utilized for personnel, cargo, and deceleration purposes, and aircraft liquid oxygen converters.

(f) Military pyrotechnics including projectors therefor.

(g) Specialized military training equipment.

(h) Tear gas and equipment for the dissemination thereof.

CATEGORY XII—CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

All material not enumerated herein which is classified from the standpoint of military security.

This proclamation shall become effective on January 1, 1954, and shall on that date supersede Proclamation No. 2776 of March 26, 1948, entitled "Enumeration of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War".

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this eighteenth day of November in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and fifty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-eighth.

John Foster Dulles

By the President:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State.

Mutual Benefits from U. S.-Spanish Security Agreements

by James Clement Dunn
Ambassador to Spain¹

There is a sound historical basis for U.S.-Spanish trade, for it was from this region that Columbus set sail for the New World and it was here that the early Spanish galleons returned laden not only with glory but also with goods. The trade that grew up from these early explorations brought this city unprecedented prosperity. It is therefore quite proper that this, of all the cities which claimed him, has given Columbus a final resting place in your great and handsome cathedral.

Because of Columbus and the intrepid mariners from this region who accompanied him on his great adventure, the New World was discovered. We Americans can therefore claim that our coun-

try's connection with Spain is the oldest of all our relationships with foreign lands.

We have come a long way and today, more than ever before, our destinies are closely linked as a result of our having signed just a few weeks ago in Madrid agreements providing for economic and military cooperation between our Governments in the interests of the defense of the West and for the common benefit of both nations.²

The agreements that Spain and the United States signed have already caused repercussions around the world. In most of the Western World the news has been received with profound pleasure because it means that another strong link has been added to the defense of our civilization. To

¹ Address made before the American Chamber of Commerce, Seville, Spain, on Nov. 9, 1953.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 5, 1953, p. 435.

the Eastern World, the news was not gratifying. Proof of this fact can be seen in the propaganda now emanating from behind the Iron Curtain.

Our mutual enemies are saying that American "imperialism" is "taking over" parts of Spain. Nothing, of course, could be further from the truth. Under the agreements, Spain will allow the United States to use certain Spanish facilities, jointly with Spanish forces. These facilities will remain under Spanish sovereignty and Spanish command in all cases. The American military personnel to be stationed in Spain will be the minimum number necessary to maintain the required services. They will mostly be technicians, such as communications specialists, mechanics, supply men, and others who will provide for the maintenance of equipment.

The American personnel will wear uniforms on military stations and civilian clothes when off duty. We do not contemplate having any "troops" in Spain. It is clear that Spanish sovereignty and independence will at all times be intact.

These are facts which are stated here in the greatest clarity because I think they show that there is no attempt whatever on the part of the United States to take, rent, or infringe on any part of Spanish territory.

As far as concerns the location of the bases there are still quite a few details to be worked out with the Spanish Government officials. One thing, however, is clear. From the American side, we will maintain a policy of using as far as possible local resources. It is expected that Spanish construction companies will be used to the maximum extent possible. Improvements will be made to facilities of some Spanish airfields and naval bases which will of course become permanent assets to this country.

Maintenance of Spanish Economic Equilibrium

I have heard the fear expressed that American aid will cause inflation in the economic life of Spain. Both the Spanish and the American Governments have plans to integrate the American economic assistance in a manner that will not upset the equilibrium of the Spanish economy.

First of all it should be stated that no actual dollars will be flooded into Spain. We have never contemplated shipping dollars to Spain, as some misinformed but well-meaning persons have thought. The aid to Spain will consist of equipment for the development of Spanish agriculture, industry, and transportation and carefully chosen raw materials and commodities.

This money will not be spent all at once, nor in two or three purchases. Also the goods and materials to be bought will not arrive in Spain in one, two, or three shipments. This aid will be coming to Spain over a period of time as each project, one

by one, is approved. This is a thing which must be worked out carefully and with time. I cannot emphasize too strongly that this is not a program to be completed overnight. The money will be spent gradually and handled in such a way as to regulate its effect on the Spanish economy.

I might also point out in this connection that the amount of money to be spent is not so overwhelming that materials purchased with it cannot be usefully and harmoniously fitted into Spain's economic structure. When you consider the Spanish budget and the Spanish national income, comparing these figures with the proposed gradual influx of aid materials, you recognize that this aid will not be an upsetting force.

It should likewise be kept in mind that not a single expenditure can be made under the aid program without the consent of the Spanish and U.S. Governments. This is one of the main keys to the understanding of the entire project. The Spanish Government will thus be able to regulate both the amount and the use of the funds to be spent on economic assistance.

The total amount of economic aid will be carefully utilized within the framework of an overall program for improving the defense position of Spain. This program when approved by the Spanish and American Governments will determine the priority of the various projects under consideration.

Many of you businessmen are, of course, familiar with the operation which we call counterpart. This is a term about which we will hear a great deal in the busy days ahead. For this reason, and in order to make it clear to those of you who may not already have a working knowledge of the use of counterpart funds, I will take the liberty of giving you a simple illustration:

A Spanish industrial firm, part of whose production fits into the overall program, requires additional raw materials and machinery in order to increase production and, at the same time, operate more efficiently and sell more cheaply. Unfortunately, foreign exchange which is scarce and sometimes unavailable is required to buy these materials. Once this firm's application for raw materials and machinery under the aid program has been approved by the Spanish Government as well as the United States Government, the materials would be purchased for dollars out of the funds voted by Congress for aid to Spain, and they would be shipped here. The firm would have to pay the Spanish Government for the materials in pesetas equivalent to the amount of dollars that they cost. Thus, while pesetas must be spent, they are used to obtain materials which otherwise would be unavailable. The pesetas received by the Spanish Government would then be deposited in a special account in the Bank of Spain. These pesetas would be used only with the consent of the Spanish Government and the approval of the United States Government for certain development projects

which will benefit Spain and for part of the peseta costs of development of military facilities.

The results of this operation are that the needed raw materials help to develop Spanish industry through increased production which, in turn, enables the firm to sell more cheaply at home and gain foreign exchange through sales abroad. The pesetas will be used to pay the wages of Spanish construction employees and for other local services and facilities. With both Governments strictly controlling both the dollar and peseta expenditure, the impact of these expenditures will be greatly minimized.

When we speak of inflation we mean usually a rise in prices caused by a sharply increased demand for goods, due to availability of money or credit, which in turn causes such goods to become scarce and therefore more difficult and more costly to acquire. This process frequently becomes painful to the average consumer because high prices are not always accompanied by corresponding increases in wages and purchasing power.

From the moment of our earliest consideration of a military-construction program in Spain, the United States Government has been keenly aware of its responsibility to cooperate with the Spanish Government in providing the means of avoiding any inflationary effect which our joint construction program might have on the Spanish economy.

An obvious and vitally significant counterbalance to any inflationary tendencies which might otherwise develop as a direct consequence of the military construction activities will therefore be our economic-aid program. A wise selection of materials and equipment to be imported into Spain under this arrangement can be expected to offset the inflationary impact of any increase in total peseta investment which may arise from the military construction.

At the same time, it must also be remembered that not all of the goods furnished under the recent Export-Import Bank credit arrangement of \$62,500,000 have arrived in Spain. These items will also be making their contribution to the maintenance of economic equilibrium in this country.

Of course, the Spanish Government will take whatever domestic measures may be required to avoid inflation. There is no question but what it is alert to this problem. Prior to the signing of the agreements, on August 11, Minister of Commerce Manuel Arburua said in a formal interview that the problem of possible inflation has been foreseen and studied by the Spanish Government and that steps had been taken to channel the peseta counterpart of dollar aid into "reproductive investment." I assure you that the Minister has our wholehearted cooperation.

I am convinced that, with the cooperation of the Spanish officials which we enjoy, we will all be fully alert to these problems. And, working together to solve them, we believe we will be able to demonstrate conclusively that the understand-

able fears that have been expressed in some quarters are exaggerated.

Purposes of Agreements

Let us look for a moment at the agreements themselves. They are three in number. One provides for the construction and use of military facilities in Spain by the United States. Under the terms of this agreement, the United States will expand certain Spanish military airfields for joint use by the Spanish Air Force and the United States Air Force, and develop some naval facilities for similar joint use by the Spanish and United States Navies. This agreement leaves room for further construction of additional military installations as future conditions may require.

Another agreement provides for economic assistance to Spain under the terms of the Mutual Security Act. This assistance will help to finance Spanish imports of industrial raw materials, commodities, machinery, and equipment, including such technical assistance as may be required.

The third agreement provides for military aid from the United States to contribute to the defense of Spain by assisting its air, ground, and naval forces. This aid will increase the effectiveness of the air defenses of this country and add equipment for military and naval activities. This is a strictly military agreement to help in the development of Spain's defenses should a moment come when she—and we—are faced with the necessity of defending ourselves from military aggression.

As for the amount of U.S. funds involved, the Congress in 1951 appropriated 125 millions to be spent in Spain for economic, technical, and military assistance under the terms of the Mutual Security Act. This sum was renewed in the 1952 Appropriations Act. When the Congress considered the allocations for Spain this year, it decided not only to renew the original appropriations but to add 101 million to it. Thus we arrived at the total of 226 millions of which 85 million is destined for defense support economic assistance, and 141 million for military aid-item assistance.

To help in carrying out the terms of these agreements, two special groups have been established in Madrid under my supervision similar to those in other countries receiving economic, technical, and military aid from the United States.

An economic group, known as the United States Operations Mission, has been established with Edward L. Williams as its director, and I am happy that he was able to come down with me and be here tonight since he was very anxious to see this city and know firsthand something of its activities. This group will develop the economic and technical-assistance programs in cooperation with Spanish officials who have been named on the new Interministerial Coordinating Commission. On the military side, Maj. Gen. A. W. Kissner of our Air Force will remain to direct both

the military assistance and construction aspects of the program with the appropriate Spanish authorities. I am fully confident that the friendly and cooperative atmosphere of our previous negotiations will continue through all our dealings under the new commissions.

We have spoken now of the terms and advantages of these agreements to Spain and to the United States. What do they really add up to? They mean, in the broadest sense, that these two nations are united in a common moral front against the dangers which face Western civiliza-

tion. For, without this mutual inspiration behind us as a guiding force, the terms of our agreements would lack the proper motivation for real success.

For my part, I am convinced that we are on our way to victory over the forces which would like to divide, weaken, and defeat us. We must now work hard to maintain our unity of purpose and mutual defense against those forces. For they would rob us not only of our lives but of that which Spaniards and Americans hold even dearer, our common Western civilization.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned during November 1953

ILO Building, Civil Engineering and Public Works Committee: 4th Session.	Geneva.	Oct. 26-Nov. 7
U. N. Permanent Central Opium Board: 63d Session	Geneva.	Oct. 26-Nov. 14
U. N. 10th Joint Session of Permanent Central Opium Board and Narcotic Drugs Supervisory Body.	Geneva.	Oct. 26-Nov. 14
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 2d Session of the 12th Plenary Meeting.	Washington.	Nov. 2-12
First International Congress of Tribunales de Cuentas (General Accounting Offices).	Habana	Nov. 2-9
Joint FAO/WHO Technical Committee on Dietary Requirements (Protein Malnutrition).	Jamaica	Nov. 2-6
WMO 1st Session of Commission for Agricultural Meteorology . . .	Paris.	Nov. 3-20
FAO Desert Locust Control Meeting	Damascus	Nov. 5-8
U. N. 4th Conference on Technical Assistance	New York	Nov. 12-14
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 22d Session	Rome	Nov. 13-17
FAO Drafting Committee	Rome	Nov. 16-18
8th Pacific Science Congress	Manila	Nov. 16-28
Symposium on Physical and Biological Oceanography (In conjunction with 8th Pacific Science Congress).	Quezon City	Nov. 16-28
U. N. Technical Assistance Committee Working Party	New York	Nov. 16-19
FAO Committee on Relations with International Organizations . . .	Rome	Nov. 17 (1 day)
FAO Council: 18th Session.	Rome	Nov. 18-21
ILO Governing Body (and its Committees): 123d Session	Geneva.	Nov. 18-28
Meeting of the Technical Committee on the Organization of National Highway Departments.	Lima.	Nov. 23-30

In Session as of November 30, 1953

U. N. General Assembly: 8th Session	New York	Sept. 15-
ICAO Council: 20th Session	Montreal	Oct. 27-
ICAO Standing Committee on Aircraft Performance: 3d Session . . .	Montreal	Nov. 11-
U. N. Reconvening of Intergovernmental Tin Conference	Geneva.	Nov. 16-
ICAO African-Indian Ocean Regional Air Navigation Meeting: 2d Session.	Santa Cruz de Tenerife	Nov. 17-

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Nov. 23, 1953. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECAFE—Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; Ecosoc—Economic and Social Council; FAO—Food and Agriculture Organization; ICAO—International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO—International Labor Organization; NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organization; WHO—World Health Organization; WMO—World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

In Session as of November 30, 1953—Continued

FAO 7th Session of the Conference	Rome	Nov. 23-
WMO Commission for Bibliography and Publications: 1st Session	Paris	Nov. 24-
Caribbean Commission: 17th Meeting	Trinidad	Nov. 30-
Customs Cooperation Council: 3d Session	Brussels	Nov. 30-
ILO Coal Mines Committee: 5th Session	Düsseldorf	Nov. 30-
International Tin Study Group: Management Committee	Geneva	Nov. 30-
U. N. Resumed 16th Session of the Economic and Social Council	New York	Nov. 30-

Scheduled December 1, 1953—February 28, 1954

Bermuda Talks	Bermuda	Dec. 4-
NATO Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council	Paris	Dec. 14-
FAO Council: 19th Session	Rome	Dec. 15*
International Sugar Council	London	Dec. 16-
U. N. Ecosoc Subcommission for Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities	New York	Jan. 4-
WHO Executive Board and Committee on Administration and Finance: 13th Meeting	Geneva	Jan. 12-
U. N. Petitions Committee	New York	Jan. 12-
World Coffee Congress and International Coffee Culture Exposition	Curitiba	Jan. 14-
WMO 1st Session of the Regional Association for the Southwest Pacific	Melbourne	Jan. 19-
U. N. ECAFE Inland Transport Committee: 3d Session	Nuwara Eliya	Jan. 20-
FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: 5th Session	Bangkok	Jan. 22-
U. N. Trusteeship Council: 13th Session	New York	Jan. 26-
U. N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Trade: 6th Session	Nuwara Eliya	Jan. 26-
1st Meeting of the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission	United States	Jan.-
Caribbean Conference on Telegraphic Rates	Trinidad	Jan.-
U. N. Economic Commission for Latin America: Committee of the Whole	Santiago	Feb. 1-
WMO Commission for Aeronautical Meteorology: 1st Session	Montreal	Feb. 2-
U. N. ECAFE: 10th Session of the Commission	Nuwara Eliya	Feb. 8-
ILO Inland Transport Committee: 5th Session	Geneva	Feb. 15-
U. N. Committee on Human Rights: 10th Session	New York	Feb. 22-
U. N. Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations	New York	Feb. 22*-
WMO Eastern Caribbean Hurricane Committee of Regional Association IV (North and Central America)	Trinidad	Feb. 24-
ILO Governing Body: 124th Session	Geneva	Feb.-
ICAO North Atlantic Ocean Weather Stations Conference	Paris	Feb.-

The Nature of U. S.—Puerto Rican Relations

Following are the texts of statements made in Committee IV (Trusteeship) by Mrs. Frances P. Bolton, U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, on October 30 and November 3, and by Antonio Fernos-Isern, U.S. Special Representative in that Committee, on October 30:

OCTOBER 30 STATEMENT BY MRS. BOLTON

U.S. delegation press release dated October 27

As we take up item 3 (b) of our agenda, Cessation of Information on Puerto Rico,¹ it is my pleasure to advise the Committee that the spokesman for the U.S. Government and the Govern-

ment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico will be Dr. Antonio Fernos-Isern, the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico before our Federal Government in Washington.

I trust that the members of the Committee will find the discussion of this item interesting and as a result will appreciate why the Governments of Puerto Rico and the United States are so satisfied with the full measure of self-government which has been achieved by the people of Puerto Rico under the Commonwealth Constitution which came into effect on July 25, 1952. I should like to touch briefly on the main events which preceded the decision of the U.S. Government to cease transmitting information on Puerto Rico under article 73 (e) of the charter.

EDITOR'S NOTE. On Nov. 5 Committee IV, by a vote of 22-18-19, adopted a draft resolution (A/C.4/L.303) approving the cessation of the transmission by the United States of information on Puerto Rico.

¹ For documents concerning the cessation of transmission of information on Puerto Rico (circulated by the Secretary-General on Apr. 3 as U.N. doc. A/AC.35/L.121), see BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1953, p. 585.

December 7, 1953

In 1948 the Puerto Rican people held a national election in which the issue as to what kind of government they desired was debated. Alternatives which were campaigned for by opposing political parties were whether Puerto Rico should become—

- (1) A State in our Federal Union;
- (2) An independent State;
- (3) A Commonwealth associated with the United States.

By an overwhelming vote the people of Puerto Rico chose the commonwealth association with the United States.

Subsequently the Resident Commissioner, Dr. Fornos, caused legislation to be introduced in the Congress of the United States to give effect to the will of the Puerto Rican people as expressed in the 1948 election. The result of this legislation was the adoption by the Eighty-first Congress of Public Law 600 which authorized the people of Puerto Rico to draft and adopt their own constitution.

Following the adoption of Public Law 600 a constitutional convention was convened in Puerto Rico, presided over by Dr. Fornos.

In due course the new Constitution was ratified by the Congress of the United States and the Puerto Rican people, again by an overwhelming majority.

A fundamental feature of the new Constitution is that it was entered into in the nature of a compact between the American Congress and the Puerto Rican people. This arrangement has been described by Senator Butler of Nebraska, chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and co-sponsor of Public Law 600, as a relationship between two parties which may not be amended or abrogated unilaterally. Congressman Miller of Nebraska, speaking as chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, has said:

Thus, Puerto Rico . . . is a Commonwealth, comparable in its political authority to any of the 48 Commonwealths which we know as the 48 States that form the Union; but under the terms of compact embodied in Public Law 600 of the Eighty-first Congress, 1950, the Federal Government of the United States will do for it what it does for the 48 member States of the Union, while it will not interfere in any matter not normally reserved to a federal government in a federal system.

Moreover, the U.S. District Court for Puerto Rico, which is a Federal court, has ruled on this relationship as follows:

As a necessary legal consequence of said compact, neither the Congress of the United States nor the people of Puerto Rico can unilaterally amend Public Law 600 nor the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act without the consent and approval of the other party to the compact.

This decision of the U.S. District Court has been upheld in the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.

Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I should like to say a few words about my distinguished col-

league of long standing in the U.S. House of Representatives, Dr. Fornos.

For many years Dr. Fornos has represented the people of Puerto Rico in the U.S. Congress and the Government in Washington. At the present time he serves as a member of the House Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs, Agriculture, and Armed Services.

While my friend Gov. Luis Muñoz Marín of Puerto Rico may be described as the spiritual father of the new Commonwealth Constitution, certainly Dr. Fornos-Isern should be regarded as its powerful architect. As I have already noted, he served as president of the Constitutional Convention, and my Government could have no better qualified spokesman to deal with our present agenda item.

It gives me great pleasure to introduce to you and to turn over the U.S. chair, as we did this year in the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, to Dr. Antonio Fornos-Isern, Resident Commissioner for Puerto Rico in the U.S. House of Representatives.²

STATEMENT BY DR. FERNOS-ISERN

U.S. delegation press release dated October 29

[Translation]

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was established on July 25, 1952.

The people of Puerto Rico took the following steps in arriving at their present status:

1. In the general elections of November 1948, the people categorically and unequivocally placed their trust in the party whose platform proposed the political status now achieved by the people of Puerto Rico. In so doing, the people rejected the programs of two political parties which did propose and still propose, respectively, complete separation from the United States and integration into the Federal Union of the United States.

2. On March 13, 1950, the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico in the United States, elected to office as a candidate of the party that received the majority support of the electorate on the basis of its program, introduced in the Congress of the United States a bill, H. R. 7674, to establish the status decided upon by the people of Puerto Rico.

3. Upon enactment of this legislation (P. L. 600 of 1950) by the Congress of the United States during that very session, the people of Puerto Rico accepted, in a referendum held on June 4, 1951, the terms of compact embodied in the above-mentioned law which set forth the basis for the political organization of the people of Puerto Rico.

4. On August 27, 1951, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention which drafted the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

² For text of Dr. Fornos' statement in the Committee on Information, see BULLETIN of Sept. 21, 1953, p. 393.

were elected. This election was held in accordance with the laws of Puerto Rico.

5. The Constitution approved by the Constitutional Convention was ratified by the people of Puerto Rico on March 3, 1952.

6. On July 3, 1952, the Congress of the United States approved the Joint Resolution (P. L. 447 of 1952) which ratified the Constitution of Puerto Rico, such ratification subject to the acceptance by the Constitutional Convention of Puerto Rico of certain stipulations which were to be submitted to said Constitutional Convention for approval or rejection.

7. Subsequently, the Constitutional Convention approved the stipulations set forth by the Congress.

8. On July 25, 1952, the Governor of Puerto Rico proclaimed the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. By the terms of its Constitution, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is an *estado libre asociado*. It is, therefore, a state, duly constituted by the people of Puerto Rico in their own territory in the exercise of their natural right. It is so declared by the Constitution, which establishes a republican form of government.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is a *free state* inasmuch as it is not subject to any superior authority. While it functions in accordance with the terms of a political and economic compact solemnly entered into with the United States of America, its authority emanates from the sovereignty of the people of Puerto Rico. The executive, legislative, and judicial powers are exclusively responsible to the people of Puerto Rico.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is a *state associated with the United States* by virtue of the fact that the people of Puerto Rico, upon constituting themselves as a Commonwealth, agreed that the exercise of certain aspects of political authority, with corresponding responsibilities, remain with the Government of the United States.

These powers and responsibilities are, generally speaking, those which the people of the United States delegated to the Federal Government created under the Constitution of the United States, and which are not reserved to the member States of the Federal Union. However, the Federal Government does not have, as in the case of the States of the Union, the power to tax the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico is not a constitutional part of the Federal Union but is associated with the Union by virtue of a bilateral compact.

Structure of the Commonwealth

The Commonwealth functions, by virtue of its own Constitution, within the framework of its political and economic association with the United States in accordance with the provisions of the compact upon which the association is formed. The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto

Rico proclaims the political sovereignty of the people of Puerto Rico. This Constitution and the terms of the association have been each sanctioned by the people of Puerto Rico in referenda and ratified by the Congress of the United States (P. L. 600 of the 81st Congress and P. L. 447 of the 82d Congress).

The nature of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is profoundly democratic. Universal suffrage is guaranteed to both men and women under the Constitution and there are no requirements with respect to property or literacy. The ballot is secret. General elections are held every 4 years. Representation in the legislative body is assured to all minority parties on a quasiproportional basis. The legislative, executive, and judicial powers are completely independent of each other and responsible only to the people of Puerto Rico. The Chief Executive may be impeached by the legislative power.

The Constitution fully guarantees freedom of speech and press; protects citizens against invasion of their right to privacy; establishes trial by jury in all felony cases, as well as the right of habeas corpus; guarantees the right to life, to property, and liberty of which no one may be deprived without due process of law.³

Association with the United States

The specific terms of the association between the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the United States are embodied in the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act as established by the compact.

Provisions of law which originally were enacted by unilateral action of the Congress of the United States and which Puerto Rico wished to preserve now became, by virtue of the compact, bilateral stipulations forming the association between Puerto Rico and the United States. Such provisions are the framework of political and economic relations within which the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico exists. Naturally, since the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act is a part of the compact, it cannot be amended except by mutual agreement between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States. As stated a few moments ago by my congressional colleague, Mrs. Bolton, the U.S. Federal courts have tested this principle and upheld it.

Terms of Political Union

Following are the fundamental aspects of the political union between the United States and Puerto Rico:

1. The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States will be respected in Puerto Rico

³ For an analysis of the human rights provisions of the Constitution, see *ibid.*, Nov. 10, 1952, p. 758.

in the same manner as if Puerto Rico were a member State of the Federal Union and subject to the provisions of the first paragraph of section 2 of article IV of the Constitution of the United States, which reads as follows: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."

2. The citizens of Puerto Rico are citizens of the United States. United States citizenship, with which Puerto Ricans are invested, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, means—

(a) that for international purposes the citizens of Puerto Rico are citizens of the United States;

(b) that a Puerto Rican citizen can freely enter the United States with all constitutional guarantees as a citizen of the United States and that upon acquiring residence in a State of the Union he automatically becomes a citizen of the State within which he resides, enjoying all the rights and privileges relating thereto.

3. Citizens of the United States, after having resided in Puerto Rico for one year, automatically become citizens of Puerto Rico.

4. All the public domain including ports, navigable waterways, submerged lands, and adjacent islands and waters are under the control of the people of Puerto Rico and therefore of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, except for certain old fortifications originally belonging to the Spanish Crown which were reserved in 1900 for use by the Federal Government and other Federal property acquired through purchases.

5. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico exercises complete authority over its internal affairs. On the other hand, the functions of the U.S. Government in Puerto Rico are subject to the same constitutional limitations as in the States of the Union. The Congress of the United States has therefore agreed that Puerto Rico will be free of control or intervention in its internal affairs.

Furthermore, Puerto Rico is exempted from:
(1) U.S. laws locally inapplicable, which of course include laws contrary to the terms of the compact;
(2) and, expressly, U.S. tax laws.

6. Puerto Rico freely elects a Resident Commissioner to the United States who represents Puerto Rico before all departments of the Government of the United States. The Resident Commissioner enjoys the privileges of membership without vote in the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress.

Terms of Economic Union

The principal provisions for economic union between Puerto Rico and the United States, most of which provisions were originally established in 1900 and upon which the economy of Puerto Rico is based, are the following:

1. Foreign products entering Puerto Rico pay

the same customs duty as paid upon entry into continental United States. The sole exception to this rule is coffee, which enters duty-free into continental United States but which is subject to customs duty in Puerto Rico in order to protect Puerto Rican coffee in the local market. Customs duties collected in Puerto Rico are covered into the Treasury of Puerto Rico.

2. There are no customs duties between Puerto Rico and the United States.

3. While products of the United States exported to Puerto Rico are free from internal revenue taxes in the United States, they are subject in Puerto Rico to the same taxes as apply to Puerto Rican products under the laws of Puerto Rico. These taxes are paid into the Commonwealth Treasury. For instance, in the United States, cigarettes are subject to a Federal internal revenue tax of 8 cents per package, but when exported for consumption in Puerto Rico they are exempt from the Federal tax. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico imposes and collects its own revenue tax on these cigarettes, and the proceeds of such taxes are paid into the Commonwealth Treasury.

4. On the other hand, the products of Puerto Rico exported to the United States before leaving Puerto Rico are subject to a countervailing tax equal to taxes imposed in the United States upon the same domestic products of the United States. The proceeds of these taxes are paid into the Treasury of Puerto Rico. Such tax on rum exported from Puerto Rico to the United States mainland during the last 18 years has amounted to a revenue of 261 million dollars covered into the Treasury of Puerto Rico.

5. The U.S. Government collects a processing tax on sugar refined in Puerto Rico equal to the tax collected in continental United States on domestically refined sugar. This processing tax is paid into the Federal Treasury, but the Federal Treasury pays to Puerto Rican sugarcane growers a subsidy for each hundredweight of sugar produced in Puerto Rico, the same as paid in the United States. Puerto Rico receives in this operation benefits amounting to 15 million dollars each year.

Within the system of marketing quotas to which domestic and imported sugar is subject in the United States, Puerto Rico has a sugar quota which is higher than that of any other domestic region, except the beet producing area which comprises not less than eight States of the Union.

6. The United States Social Security system is extended to Puerto Rico except for unemployment insurance provisions. Since Social Security is based on payments made both by employers and workers and, since Puerto Rico is not subject to federal taxation, it was left to the legislature of Puerto Rico to accept or reject the extension of the U.S. Social Security system. The legislature of Puerto Rico approved participation of Puerto Rico in the system.

7. All operating expenses of the U.S. Government services in Puerto Rico, including defense, are paid by the Treasury of the United States. The expense of the National Guard of Puerto Rico while in the service of the State is shared by the Commonwealth and the Federal Government. When the National Guard goes into Federal service, its expenses are borne exclusively by the Federal Treasury.

8. Laws providing economic cooperation between the Federal Government and the States of the Union for the construction of roads, schools, public-health services, school-lunchroom services, credit and employment service, public housing, etc., are extended to Puerto Rico. All such joint programs, operating with the financial aid of the Federal Government, are administered by the Commonwealth Government. Commonwealth Government bond issues are exempt from all taxes in the United States.

Amendments to the Constitution

Amendments to the Constitution of Puerto Rico may be adopted only by the people of Puerto Rico. They are not subject to subsequent approval by the U.S. Congress.

Erroneous Interpretations

A minority political party, the Independence Party, maintains that Puerto Rico has not yet achieved a full measure of self-government. According to its interpretation, the Congress of the United States retains the following powers:

1. The power to revoke or amend unilaterally the Constitution of the Commonwealth.
2. The power to repeal or unilaterally amend Public Law 600 and the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, upon which the compact between the two peoples rests.
3. The power to repeal, amend, or suspend any law approved by the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico.
4. The power to enact legislation concerning the internal as well as the external affairs of Puerto Rico, without restriction.

Obviously, this is a mistaken interpretation. It is also obvious that those who hold this view lack the necessary political or juridical authority to propound it. Only the people of Puerto Rico and the Government of the United States have effective authority to interpret the compact. The Independence Party has consistently held to its thesis throughout the referenda held to approve the Constitution and the compact and again during the general elections of 1952. The Constitutional Assembly as well as the Puerto Rican electorate decisively rejected the Independence Party's position.

Contrary to the position taken by the Independence Party, as well as that held by the National-

ist and Communist groups, the people of Puerto Rico hold that the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth can be amended, suspended, or repealed only by their authority and that the compact between the United States and Puerto Rico can be amended or repealed only by mutual consent. As in the case of the States of the Union, Congress does not have the power to enact legislation relative to affairs in Puerto Rico. These powers, according to the provisions of the compact, rest solely with the sovereignty of the people of Puerto Rico. In regard to external matters, the Congress of the United States is subject, in the case of Puerto Rico, to the same constitutional restrictions which limit its functions with respect to the States of the Federal Union. This is also the understanding of the Government of the United States of America.

Dynamics of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

Since the political authority of the Commonwealth with reference to the internal affairs of the people of Puerto Rico has no other limitations than that imposed upon it by its own Constitution, which emanated from the will of the people, the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has complete authority to deal with all its fundamental problems—be they economic, social, or cultural. As an example, the task of breaking up large corporate land holdings and of reducing absentee land ownership, which was started under Federal legislation prior to the foundation of the Commonwealth, still continues under the laws of Puerto Rico.

Similarly, the Commonwealth by virtue of its full authority has taken the initiative in the field of public education. A realistic educational policy has been set up whereby Spanish is retained as the teaching medium in the schools, thus preserving Puerto Rico's cultural traditions. However English has been added as a necessary tool essential to the full development of all aspects of Puerto Rican life.

The index of Puerto Rico's development in the field of labor legislation is found in the enactment of unemployment insurance for sugar-cane workers and the minimum wage law.

All this legislative effort is an expression of Puerto Rico's own particular policies. These laws have been adopted by the people of the Commonwealth in the exercise of their own exclusive authority and responsibility in this field.

Thus the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, its citizens free from taxes payable to the Federal Treasury, receiving cooperation from the U.S. Government for social, economic, and educational purposes, without any limitation placed upon its autonomy, can make use of all of its resources for social, economic, and cultural development programs, in accordance with its own policies and on the basis of its own philosophy of government.

The cardinal principle of its association with

the United States is that of a compact whose provisions can be changed, but only bilaterally, by mutual consent, so that Puerto Rico's relationships with the United States may always result in mutually satisfactory conditions.

Puerto Rico's political life embodies the substance of true sovereignty. Government stems entirely from free decisions of the people through the ballot and is based on a Constitution drafted and approved by the people themselves, which can only be altered by the people. The planning for the country's social and economic development is made possible by the Commonwealth Government's full authority over the tax-paying potential of its citizens. Transformation into an industrial society with a high living standard becomes possible because of its free access to the world's richest consumer market. With the United States having recognized that its relationships with Puerto Rico are based upon free determination and the principle of mutual consent, the way is open for future manifestations of the will of the people of Puerto Rico as it may find expression in the exercise of the democratic process of the ballot.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the result of a people's creativeness, brings before the international community a new form of political relationship, a new kind of association between people. Thus the last vestige of colonialism has disappeared in Puerto Rico. And thus a people of America have entered upon the enjoyment of freedom in harmony with their cultural values, their economic needs, and the imperatives of social justice.

NOVEMBER 3 STATEMENT BY MRS. BOLTON

U.S. delegation press release dated November 3.

It is the intention of my delegation to make a final statement when all other delegations have had an opportunity to express their points of view on the subject under consideration.⁴ However, I should like to clarify, at the outset of our discussions today, a number of points raised in yesterday's debate in order that certain misconceptions which evidently exist will not continue to cloud our discussion.

1. First of all, reference has been made to the letter addressed by the Governor of Puerto Rico to the President of the United States.⁵ Through an error by one speaker the Governor has been quoted as stating in his letter that at present the Congress of the United States retains full jurisdiction to legislate with respect to Puerto Rico without the

consent of its people, to override its laws, to change its form of government, and to alter its relations to the United States. The letter of the Governor states, on the contrary, that until the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico began to function, the Congress of the United States retained full jurisdiction. I hasten to rectify this matter because I know how the Governor of Puerto Rico would feel if his interpretation of the compact were not properly presented.

2. In further elaboration of the remarks I made yesterday,⁶ may I say that obviously U.S. laws and such compacts as the United States may enter into are subject to the interpretation of the United States and the parties concerned, in this case the people of Puerto Rico. In a spirit of cooperation we have brought before you the U.S. interpretation which is also that of the people of Puerto Rico. We would not feel justified in engaging in a debate as to the significance of U.S. laws, less so after they have been interpreted by the courts of the United States. Nor have we thought it proper to pay attention to such distortions as have been made by and circulated in behalf of those who as self-appointed interpreters of the U.S. laws, compacts, and agreements would lead us to believe that nothing except their own cherished ideas should be accepted no matter how impractical and contrary to the wishes of the people of Puerto Rico such ideas may be and what may be their motivation.

3. Two facts stand out of all the documentation transmitted by the United States to the United Nations. One is that the people of Puerto Rico have organized themselves politically under a Constitution of their own adoption whereby a republican form of government has been created stemming from the sovereignty of the people of Puerto Rico. This fact is amply sustained by the language of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico itself. The second fact is that there exists a bilateral compact of association between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States which has been accepted by both and which in accordance with judicial decisions may not be amended without common consent.

Authority of the Commonwealth

4. The nature of the relations established by compact between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States, far from preventing the existence of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as a fully self-governing entity, gives the necessary guarantees for the untrammelled development and exercise of its political authority. The authority of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is not more limited than that of any State of the Union; in fact in certain aspects it is much wider. It would be absurd to claim that the 48 States of the Union

⁴ For further statements by Mrs. Bolton in Committee IV containing (1) comments on views expressed by certain delegations and (2) an explanation of the vote on the Puerto Rican item, see U.S. delegation press releases dated Nov. 5 and Nov. 6, respectively.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1953, p. 588.

⁶ Not printed.

are not fully self-governing entities. In accordance with the principle of federation, the people who have created and organized State governments in accordance with their own State constitutions have also relinquished certain attributes of authority to the Federal Government which the State governments do not have. In accordance with the compact between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States, the people of Puerto Rico have agreed that the Government of the United States may have, concerning Puerto Rico, the functions and authority that the U.S. Government has concerning the States of the Union. Therefore, to say that this latter fact negates self-government in Puerto Rico would be tantamount to saying that self-government does not exist in the 48 States of the Union.

It should be remembered that the functions of the Federal Government in Puerto Rico are carried out under the same laws and within the same constitutional limitations under which they are carried out on behalf of the States. This qualifies the exercise of Federal authority in Puerto Rico and protects the self-governing powers of Puerto Rico. That the participation of the people of Puerto Rico in the Federal Government is not the same as that of the people of any State of the Union is easily understandable if it is borne in mind that the obligations of the people of Puerto Rico toward the Federal Government, especially in matters of a fiscal nature, are not the same as those of the people of the 48 States. In order for the people of Puerto Rico to participate equally as the people of the 48 States in the affairs of the Federal Government, Puerto Rico would have to become constitutionally integrated permanently as a State of the Union with all the corresponding obligations without exception. This proposal has been before the people of Puerto Rico as the program of one of its political parties. The people haven't chosen it as the type of relationship to which they would give their preference.

5. In presenting the case of Puerto Rico before this Committee, the U.S. delegation has not at any time stated that in creating the present association between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States any heretofore known type of association has been adopted. Much to the contrary, the criterion followed has been to assist the people of Puerto Rico "in the progressive development of their free political institutions according to the particular circumstances" of Puerto Rico. It has been evident to the people of Puerto Rico that should they follow such known types of political relations as those of independence, or full integration into the Union, they would jeopardize their own paramount interests in economic, social, and educational as well as in political matters. The criteria followed in the establishment of the existing association between Puerto Rico and the United States have been to create such relationships as would insure for the people of Puerto Rico

the best opportunities to develop socially, economically, and culturally, taking into consideration their geographic and demographic circumstances. It is in this light that the terms of political and economic union referred to by Dr. Fernos-Isern should be viewed.

6. As an instance to illustrate what I have said, I shall refer to the question of minimum wages in Puerto Rico. There are no trade barriers between Puerto Rico and the United States, as there are no trade barriers between any two States of the Union. It might have been considered only fair in order not to give undue advantage to Puerto Rican producers over mainland producers in the mainland market to have the same provisions of law apply in Puerto Rico. However, because Puerto Rico is not as industrially developed as the 48 States of the Union, the law provides special treatment for Puerto Rico and exempts it from the fixed minimum to which all wages in the industries of the United States are subject. The wages in Puerto Rico are determined in such manner that the workers may be paid as high a wage as the circumstances of the industry may warrant. However, they are not necessarily as high as those on the mainland lest such requirement stifle Puerto Rican industries. This places Puerto Rico in a competitive position in relation to the U.S. market to which it has free access. Only the laws of Puerto Rico apply to any industry not engaged in external trade.

Sugar Quota

7. Another case in point is the reference made to the quota on Puerto Rican sugar that may be marketed in the United States. Sugar marketing in the United States is subject to quota not only in what concerns Puerto Rico but in what concerns the 48 States as well as importations from foreign countries. As a result of this system of marketing quotas, the price of sugar has been stabilized. Puerto Rico not only sells its sugar in the United States at the same price that U.S. domestic sugar is sold, free from customs duties, but the growers receive benefit payments equal to those of the mainland producers. One of the aspects of the economic union most favorable to Puerto Rico is to be found in these provisions concerning sugar. Should Puerto Rico separate from the United States, it certainly would have no claim, on the basis of its status, to customs-free entry of sugar into the United States, nor to a quota commensurate with its production capacity, nor to the benefit payments that domestic sugar producers are accorded. The fact that Puerto Rico refines all sugar consumed in Puerto Rico and ships to the United States a certain amount of its sugar quota, as refined sugar, limits the amount which may be refined in the mainland. Dr. Fernos, as a member of the House of Representatives Commit-

tee on Agriculture, would be pleased to discuss with any interested members of the Committee the United States Sugar Act.

8. It would be a great mistake to consider that because the functions of the Federal Government in Puerto Rico are conducted under the same laws as those functions are carried on in the United States, the authority of the people of Puerto Rico in the conduct of their own Government, under their own laws, is diminished. In a federal system the fact that certain functions are reserved to the federal government does not mean that the authority of the government of the several states, in all matters not delegated to the federal government, are not fully within the power of the states. Again in this regard Puerto Rico is not in any position different from that of any State of the Union.

9. The Federal Relations Act to which reference has been made has continued provisions of political and economic union which the people of Puerto Rico have wished to maintain. In this sense the relationships between Puerto Rico and the United States have not changed. It would be wrong however to hold that because this is so and has been so declared in Congress the creation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico does not signify a fundamental change in the status of Puerto Rico. The previous status of Puerto Rico was that of a territory subject to the full authority of the Congress of the United States in all governmental matters. The previous Constitution of Puerto Rico was in fact a law of the Congress of the United States, which we called an organic act. Only Congress could amend the organic act of Puerto Rico. The present status of Puerto Rico is that of a people with a constitution of their own adoption, stemming from their own authority which only they can alter or amend. The relationships previously established also by a law of the Congress, which only Congress could amend, have now become provisions of a compact of a bilateral nature whose terms may be changed only by common consent.

10. I submit that having before us the Constitution of Puerto Rico, and with Public Laws 600 of 1950 and 447 of 1952 having been circulated, if an opinion as to the status of Puerto Rico is to be formed and any interpretation is needed, that offered by the parties concerned should prevail. To go back to statements made in the course of debate in Congress or in hearings and to try to interpret the documents before us in the light of isolated utterances, brought before us out of context, can only lead to utter confusion.

11. As a member of the Congress which took part in all the legislative processes which culminated in the compact between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States whereby the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was established, I was impressed by the fact that at all times the whole nature of the process was that of bilateral agree-

ment. Even when the joint resolution approving the Constitution for Puerto Rico was before Congress and some reservations appeared to be necessary in order to clarify the fact that the Constitution of Puerto Rico would conform with the terms of compact, such clarifications as were decided upon by the Congress were submitted to the approval of the Constitutional Convention of Puerto Rico.

Question of Congressional Voting Rights

12. Some pain has been expressed in the Committee because the Resident Commissioner, who holds a seat in the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress, does not have full voting rights. This, Mr. Chairman, cannot be regarded as painful to the people of Puerto Rico.

Under the U.S. Constitution, Puerto Rico could obtain full legislative representation in the U.S. Congress only if it were a State like one of the 48, subject to all pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the United States. In that case however the people of Puerto Rico would lose the fiscal advantages which they now enjoy as a result of their present relationship to the United States. The Constitution of the United States would require this result. The people of Puerto Rico are not subject to Federal income taxes on the income they derive from sources within Puerto Rico or to any other internal revenue taxes. The proceeds of U.S. internal revenue taxes collected on articles produced in Puerto Rico and shipped to the United States are covered into the Treasury of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Also, the proceeds of tariff and customs collected on foreign merchandise entering Puerto Rico are deposited in the Puerto Rican Treasury for appropriation and expenditure as the Puerto Rican Legislature may decide. These arrangements constitute substantial advantages of particular benefit to an area such as Puerto Rico whose natural economic resources are so limited. The admission into the Union under the terms of the Constitution of the United States would entail the loss of these advantages. The taxpayers of Puerto Rico would have to contribute over 100 million dollars annually to the U.S. Treasury, a sum which represents 10 percent of the national income of Puerto Rico and nearly 60 percent of its budget. For this reason the majority of the people of Puerto Rico prefer Commonwealth status, albeit it does not provide for full legislative representation in Congress, to statehood with membership in the Union of States and full legislative representation in Congress. They have expressed this preference emphatically in the election of 1948, the subsequent referenda on the new Constitution, and in the election on November 4, 1952. In this last election, the party in power received 429,064 votes out of 664,974 cast, a greater majority than ever before.

It might also be stressed that under the Commonwealth the people of Puerto Rico, besides not being subject to Federal taxes, enjoy the same advantages as their fellow citizens in the 48 States, i.e. protection by the national Government, freedom to travel in U.S. territory and to settle there, and participation in and the protection and services of the Federal civilian and military establishments. Many grants-in-aid and other Federal legislation represent further benefits to the people of Puerto Rico.

13. It has been said that the U.S. Government has not provided the General Assembly with adequate information upon which it based its decision to cease transmitting information on Puerto Rico. Mr. Chairman, I refer the Committee to the full explanations contained in document A/AC.35/L.121 of April 3, 1953,⁷ and the large volume of information transmitted for the year July 1, 1951-June 30, 1952, upon which the Secretariat's Summary, document A/2414/Add.2 of August 13, 1953 is based. I ask the Committee to decide for itself whether the United States has failed to fulfill the request for information set forth in resolution 222 (III) regarding decisions to cease transmission of information.

14. Members of the Committee who participated in this year's session of the Committee on Information and those who have studied the documentation considered by that Committee are aware of the various references made to the role of Puerto Rico in extending technical assistance in connection with various international programs. In this connection, Mr. Chairman, it is most unfortunate that the interest and enthusiasm of former Assistant Secretary of State Miller⁸ in regard to Puerto Rico, his birthplace, should be misconstrued.

I believe that Secretary Miller has merely tried to emphasize what so many other representatives of the Governments of the United States and Puerto Rico sincerely believe, namely, that Puerto Rico, with its Spanish language and cultural heritage, can help to forge stronger links of understanding between Latin America and the United States and contribute much to the advancement of the good neighbor policy in the Caribbean area.

15. Some disappointment has been expressed that Puerto Rico has not had as fortunate a fate as Cuba, both having been at one time under the sovereignty of Spain. I presume, Mr. Chairman, that this refers to the fact that Puerto Rico has not chosen to become completely independent. But our considerations here relate to self-government which has been achieved in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of an overwhelming majority of the Puerto Rican people. It is true that Puerto Rico has not chosen to separate itself

from the United States and become completely independent and therefore has not assumed control over such matters as foreign affairs and national defense. But I must point out that there are members of the United Nations who are said to be independent, yet they do not control matters of foreign relations and national defense.

16. We have been told in this Committee, in a most polite and ingenuous though nonetheless straightforward manner, that the people of Puerto Rico have bartered their individuality in exchange for purely materialistic gains, with consequent loss of their dignity as a people. But I submit, Mr. Chairman, that the very fact that Puerto Rico has developed its own concept of Commonwealth status is because it desires to retain its cultural heritage and the freedom to develop its own personality and the well-being of the Puerto Rican people without sacrificing the economic foundation upon which these paramount values are based. Poverty, hunger, and ignorance are not the ingredients with which a society of free people can be established and developed and its dignity maintained.

On the other hand, economic, social, and educational programs based upon individual initiative and local responsibility build and maintain the stature and dignity of a people. Under such circumstances freedom is established.

Mr. Chairman, I am most grateful for the patience of the Committee in permitting me to remove what I believe to have been clouds of misconception so that the discussions may continue free of misunderstanding.

U.S. Position on Question of Southwest Africa

*Statement by Mrs. Frances P. Bolton
U. S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

U.S. delegation press release dated November 11

The main issues in the Southwest Africa question have been thoroughly discussed by the speakers who have preceded me. My remarks therefore will be very brief. I would like to explain the general position of my delegation and to comment on the two draft resolutions before us.

We regret that there has been so little progress toward negotiating an agreement between the United Nations and the Union of South Africa despite the best efforts of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Southwest Africa. We appreciate the willingness of the Government of the Union of South Africa to continue negotiations with the *Ad Hoc* Committee, but we regret that South Africa has

⁷ See footnote 1.

⁸ Edward G. Miller, former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

¹ Made on Nov. 11 in Committee IV (Trusteeship).

thus far not found it possible to meet the Committee's wishes. We hope that the Union Government will carefully reexamine the question to see if it cannot find satisfactory means of accommodating itself to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. The United States continues to believe that the best solution to the Southwest African question lies in the devising of means to implement the Court's opinion, according to which the Union of South Africa continues to have the international obligations stated in article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the Mandate for Southwest Africa.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation considers that the principal provisions of the 13-power draft resolution contained in document A/C.4/L.305/Rev. 1² are reasonable proposals which are worthy of general support in this Committee. They provide for a Committee on Southwest Africa to carry on the functions formerly performed by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. It would thus give effect to the opinion of the Court which, as I have already said, my delegation supports. It is our expectation, of course, that the committee would carry out its task to the fullest possible extent in conformity with the procedure of the mandates system. The United States will vote for this draft resolution.

With regard to the 11-power draft resolution contained in document A/C.4/L.306,³ my delegation agrees with its main operative paragraph which states that the normal way of modifying the international status of Southwest Africa would be to place it under the international trusteeship system. The General Assembly has already adopted several resolutions to this effect, however, and my delegation doubts that the Assembly will increase either its stature or effectiveness by reiterating this view. Nonetheless, we have decided to vote for the resolution since it takes the Court's opinion fully into account.

² On Nov. 12 Committee IV, by a vote of 41-1 (Union of South Africa) -11, adopted the draft resolution (U.N. doc. A/C.4/L.305/Rev. 1 and Add. 1) calling for a new 9-member committee on Southwest Africa.

³ On Nov. 12 Committee IV, by a vote of 42-1 (Union of South Africa) -10, adopted the draft resolution (U.N. doc. A/C.4/L.306 and Add. 1) reaffirming that Southwest Africa should be placed under the international trusteeship system.

Correction

BULLETIN of November 23, 1953, page 730, first column: the first line of the last paragraph of text should read "It is with these thoughts and purposes that . . ." and the next-to-last line of the footnote should refer to the BULLETIN of November 24, 1952.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Security Council

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Letter dated 12 October 1953 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the President of the Security Council. S/3105, Oct. 13, 1953. 2 pp. mimeo.

Note dated 23 September 1953 from the Representative of the United States addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the appointment of General John E. Hull as the Commanding General of the Military Forces made available to the Unified Command pursuant to the Security Council resolution of 7 July 1950 (S/1588). S/3099/Rev. 1, Oct. 14, 1953. 1 p. mimeo.

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¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2060 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Disarmament Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

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643	11/28	Dulles Letter to Senator Jenner

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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Address by the President at the dedication of Falcón Dam,
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